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INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
whether “the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish
among all the countless millions of species extant would require
the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which
1
Congress has expended more than $100 million.” Stunningly, the
fish won, because the language, history, and structure of the
Endangered Species Act showed “beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
2
priorities.” The Court acknowledged that this view of the statute
3
would carry substantial economic costs, but was persuaded that
“[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
4
cost.” The Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v.
Hill served notice that the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) had the
power to become one of the nation’s most important
environmental laws.
The ESA provision that stopped the dam and saved the snail
5
darter was section 7(a)(2), which commands each federal agency
to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
6
of any endangered species or threatened species . . . .” The Court
7
stated that this provision “admits of no exception,” and that “[o]ne
would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms
8
were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.”

1. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978).
2. Id. at 174. The Endangered Species Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544(2000).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 184.
5. Ultimately, Tellico Dam was built when Congress ordered its completion despite the
ESA. The completion and closing of the dam wiped out the largest known population of
snail darters, but the species has not gone extinct. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 801–02 (3d ed. 2004).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Federal agencies also must ensure that their actions do
not “result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined . . . to be critical.” Id. The statute does not define “jeopardize the continued
existence” as used in § 7(a)(2), but ESA implementing rules define the term to mean “to
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by
reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
7. 437 U.S. at 173.
8. Id.
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The Supreme Court interpreted that same statutory provision
very differently in 2007, when it decided National Association of Home
9
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife.
Where TVA v. Hill saw plain
meaning, National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) found a
“fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by that statutory text”
10
of § 7(a)(2); where TVA v. Hill saw no exceptions, NAHB found it
reasonable to limit the application of § 7 to those actions where a
11
federal agency exercises discretionary authority.
The NAHB
decision acknowledged the power of § 7(a)(2), but effectively
12
limited the statute’s reach.
NAHB dealt with Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permitting
13
authority; unlike TVA v. Hill, the case did not directly decide the
fate of one particular dam. But the NAHB decision has strong
implications for hundreds of dams associated with federal water
projects, the operation of which could affect threatened or
14
endangered species. Under the Reclamation program, the
federal government built nearly 200 projects in seventeen western
15
16
states for a variety of purposes, primarily irrigation. Today, the
9. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
10. Id. at 2534. The Court saw ambiguity because it regarded the “no jeopardy” mandate
of § 7(a)(2) as conflicting with other statutes that impose requirements on agencies, raising
a question of implied repeal.
11. Id. at 2534, 2536. In order to avoid the potential for implied repeal of statutory
mandates by ESA § 7, the Court upheld an agency rule, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, which provides
that § 7 applies to agency actions where there is discretionary federal involvement or control.
12. The Court characterized TVA v. Hill as consistent with the idea that § 7(a)(2) “applies
to every discretionary agency action—regardless of the expense or burden its application
might impose.” Id. at 2537, 2531–32 (describing § 7(a)(2) as a “seemingly categorical”
legislative command, and as “imperative”).
13. The question in that case was whether the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
must comply with ESA § 7 in deciding whether to grant the State of Arizona’s request for
authority to issue pollution discharge permits under Clean Water Act § 402 (33 U.S.C. §
1342). The Court held that § 402 gave EPA no discretion to consider the needs of listed
species in making that decision, and so the agency was not required to comply with § 7. Id.
at 2537–38.
14. Because this article focuses on the Reclamation program, it does not address federal
water projects managed by the Army Corps of Engineers or other agencies. These other
projects, built and operated for a wide range of purposes including flood control, navigation,
hydropower, and recreation, are governed by a set of laws that differs significantly from those
that govern Reclamation projects, which generally operate primarily (though not
exclusively) for irrigation. See generally In re Operation of the Missouri River System Litig.,
421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (examining the law governing Corps of Engineers’ operation of
federal facilities on the Missouri River for multiple purposes).
15. The seventeen Reclamation states reach from North Dakota to Texas and west to the
Pacific Ocean.
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
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U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“USBR”) operates these projects to
supply water for a variety of purposes, chiefly irrigation of crops
and pasture in the arid West. Nearly all of these projects predate
the 1973 enactment of the ESA, but courts have held that USBR’s
ongoing operation of these projects is a federal agency action
18
requiring compliance with ESA § 7.
The NAHB decision bears on the question of whether § 7(a)(2)
will continue to apply to the operation of Reclamation projects by
19
In recent litigation, USBR has argued that it lacks the
USBR.
discretion to operate its projects so as to provide water for
endangered species habitats because that water is already legally
20
committed to existing users. By upholding the rule limiting the
applicability of § 7 to discretionary federal actions, and by holding
that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) lacked
discretion to consider endangered species under CWA § 402,
NAHB may increase the chances that USBR’s project operations
will be classified as the kind of non-discretionary activity that is
exempt from § 7 requirements.
Amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in NAHB show that
water users were hoping that the Court’s decision in that case
would bolster their arguments against the application of § 7 to
Reclamation projects. One brief argued that § 7(a)(2) does not
override an agency’s prior commitments, including contracts to
supply water from federal projects:
Thus, for example, if the Bureau of Reclamation enters into contracts
with water users, which obligate the Bureau to deliver water from
federal reclamation facilities to the users, the Bureau does not have
discretion to reallocate the water for the benefit of endangered
species, absent a reservation of authority in the contracts to reallocate
21
the water for this purpose.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 3–4, available at http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007).
17. USBR is part of the Department of the Interior.
18. See infra Part I.C and accompanying text.
19. Some projects are operated by water user entities, such as irrigation districts, under
an agreement with USBR, but the agency retains final authority over the operations and
maintenance of Reclamation projects, including environmental compliance. See U.S. DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION MANUAL WTR PO5 (2004),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/wtr/wtr-p05.pdf.
20. See infra notes 221–268 and accompanying text.
21. Brief for Ass’n of California Water Agencies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 29, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518
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Another amicus brief argued that if § 7 applies so broadly as to
cover water deliveries from Reclamation projects, it would probably
result in “chaos in Western water distribution, resulting in
shortages, waste, and misallocation by federal officials who have
neither the resources nor the experience to allocate and deliver
22
this life-giving resource to those who put it to beneficial use.”
This article examines the applicability of § 7(a)(2) to USBR’s
project operations in the wake of NAHB. Part I briefly offers
background on Reclamation projects, the ESA, and cases applying
§ 7 to the operation of these projects. Part II examines the rule
limiting the application of § 7 to discretionary agency actions, and
reviews caselaw from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applying
this rule to federal activities. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s
NAHB decision and its implications for the application of § 7 to
arguably non-discretionary federal agency actions.
Part IV
addresses legal and policy issues relating to the ESA and
Reclamation projects, and concludes that § 7(a)(2) should
continue to apply to USBR’s project operations.
The applicability of § 7 to Reclamation projects is an issue of
huge importance for several reasons. First, a great many people
rely on these projects for their water supply. USBR supplies water
to about 20 percent of farmers in the West, providing for irrigation
23
of close to 10 million acres. Second, the protection of § 7 may be
key to the survival and recovery of many species in the West, where
24
large-scale irrigation often places aquatic species in peril. Third,
competition for water from Reclamation projects will only grow
over time because of ongoing changes in the West’s water supplies
and demands caused by factors such as population growth, climate
(2007) (Nos. 06-340, 06-549), 2007 WL 549099.
22. Brief for Kern County Water Agency et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
9, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (Nos. 06-340,
06-549), 2007 WL 549105.
23. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION—ABOUT US,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). USBR projects also generate
enough hydropower for 6 million homes and provide public water for about 31 million
people, id., although more than 80 percent of the water from these projects goes to
irrigation. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
ACREAGE LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-2 (Feb. 1996).
24. Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish versus
Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 348 (1996) (finding that counties in the West
with the greatest amount of irrigated agriculture also have the highest number of
endangered fish species).
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change, and a growing number of species listed as threatened or
endangered.
Moreover, the effect of the ESA on USBR project operations is
important nationally, not just in the West. The 2001 Klamath Basin
water crisis resulted from the application of § 7 to one of the oldest
25
Reclamation projects. When longtime irrigators faced severe and
unprecedented cutbacks in water supplies caused by an extreme
drought and the need to protect endangered fish, it caused one of
26
the greatest controversies in the history of the ESA. The following
27
year, when USBR took a narrow view of its § 7 duties and restored
full irrigation deliveries from the Klamath Project, salmon perished
by the thousands as the Klamath River downstream suffered from
28
low flows and high temperatures. The irrigation cutback and the
29
salmon die-off both attracted national attention, demonstrating
how events involving endangered species and water users in the
West can have great national significance for the ESA.
I. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS AND THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
A. Federal Reclamation Projects
Congress launched the Reclamation program in 1902,
authorizing the Interior Secretary to build and operate large-scale
30
Under this program the
projects to irrigate the arid West.
25. For a description of Klamath Basin water issues and background on the 2001 water
crisis, see Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and
the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002).
26. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath
Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 319–27 (2003).
27. See id. at 327–33. USBR’s ten-year operating plan for the Klamath Project and the
Biological Opinion supporting it were ultimately overturned by the courts as providing
insufficient protection to threatened coho salmon in the Klamath River below the project.
See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082,
1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that government did not appeal district court’s rejection of
provision whereby Klamath Project would provide only 57% of necessary flows for salmon,
with remaining 43% to come from other sources); id. at 1090–91 (rejecting provision
allowing delivery of less than full water supplies needed by salmon for the first eight years of
the ten-year plan).
28. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 26, at 334–36.
29. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Cries of ‘Save the Suckerfish’ Rile Farmers’ Political Allies, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2001, at A1; Timothy Egan, As Thousands of Salmon Die, Fight for River Erupts Again,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A1.
30. Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered
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Reclamation Service (later USBR) built dams, canals, and other
facilities, and operated these projects to supply water to small
31
family farms. By the 1990s, the federal government had built
nearly 200 Reclamation projects throughout 17 western states, with
347 storage reservoirs, 268 major pumping plants, and over 60,000
32
miles of water distribution canals, pipelines, and ditches.
Reclamation statutes are of two basic types: first, the 1902
Reclamation Act and later statutes of general applicability that set
33
national policy for the entire USBR program, and second, projectspecific statutes that may, for example, authorize the construction
34
of a new project, or address the operation, management and
35
Most USBR projects operate
purposes of an existing project.
subject to both the general reclamation statutes and those that
pertain to a particular project, although Congress may exempt a
36
particular project from one or more features of the general laws.
The general statutes establish standard terms and procedures for
the entire program; for example, these statutes authorize certain
types of contracts for delivery of project water and limit the amount
of land that one owner can irrigate with subsidized water. By
contrast, project authorizing acts specify such things as the
purposes of a particular project or the limits on total acreage
37
irrigated by that project.
USBR manages and supplies water for a variety of uses in
38
addition to irrigation. This water is often called “project water”
because it is stored, diverted, or delivered by the facilities of a

sections of 43 U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498).
31. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ACREAGE
LIMITATION AND WATER CONSERVATION RULES AND REGULATIONS 3-2 (Feb. 1996).
32. Id.
33. Examples of general reclamation laws after 1902 include § 9 of the 1939 Reclamation
Project Act, 43 Stat. 1194 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 485h), and the 1982 Reclamation Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-295, 96 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa–390zz-1).
34. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-488, 74 Stat. 156 (authorizing the San Luis
Unit of the Central Valley Project).
35. The best known example of a statute that addresses various aspects of a pre-existing
project is the 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Title
XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
36. For example, the Boulder Canyon Project Act exempted recipients of Boulder
Canyon Project water from the acreage limitations provided in the general reclamation laws.
See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
37. See Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority over Reclamation
Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 369--72 (1997).
38. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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39

federal Reclamation project. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has made it clear that project water is legally distinct from other
kinds of water:
A distinction must be recognized between the nature of nonproject
water, such as natural flow water, and project water, and between the
manner in which rights to use of such waters are obtained. Right to
use of natural-flow water is obtained in accordance with state law. In
most western states it is obtained by appropriation—putting the water
to beneficial use upon lands. Once the rights are obtained they vest,
until abandoned, as appurtenances of the land upon which the water
has been put to use. Project water, on the other hand, would not
exist but for the fact that it has been developed by the United
States. . . . The terms upon which it can be put to use, and the
manner in which rights to continued use can be acquired, are for the
United States to fix. If such rights are subject to becoming vested
beyond the power of the United States to take without compensation,
40
such vesting can only occur on terms fixed by the United States.

Irrigators receive Reclamation project water through contracts
41
with USBR. In most cases, USBR contracts with an organization
of water users, such as an irrigation district, which in turn delivers
42
project water to individual farms. The most common type of
contract is a “repayment contract,” whereby USBR supplies water in
return for repayment of a portion of the costs of building,
43
operating, and maintaining a project. USBR also has some “water
service contracts,” whereby it provides annual water deliveries for a
44
specified term of years in return for an agreed rate of payment.
Each contract also has a variety of additional provisions, some
45
unique to that contract, some common to nearly all contracts.
For purposes of this article, one standard term is particularly
important: a provision excusing the government from liability if
for some reason it is unable to deliver a full supply of water under
46
the contract.
39. Benson, supra note 37, at 370--71.
40. Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132--33 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Flint v. United States,
906 F.2d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 1990).
41. Benson, supra note 37, at 371.
42. Id. at 371, 393.
43. Id. at 371.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 393--401.
46. This type of provision is nearly universal in these contracts, although its wording
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One important feature of the Reclamation laws is § 8 of the 1902
Act, which provides that in carrying out the program, the Interior
Secretary “shall proceed in conformity with” state laws “relating to
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
47
irrigation, or any vested rights acquired thereunder . . . .” Thus,
in building, operating, and delivering water from its projects, USBR
48
generally must comply with state water laws, although states may
not impose conditions on Reclamation projects that would frustrate
49
congressional intent or important federal interests.
B. The Endangered Species Act and Section 7
Enacted in 1973, the ESA is one of America’s best-known and
50
most important environmental laws.
The ESA’s purpose is to
51
conserve endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems
52
on which they depend. Although all federal agencies have ESA
duties, the two most responsible for determining the status and
needs of imperiled species are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) in the Interior Department, and for oceangoing species
such as salmon, the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)
53
within the Department of Commerce (together, “the Services”).
54
55
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, ESA § 9

varies somewhat from contract to contract. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
67 Fed. Cl. 504, 535 (most Klamath Project contracts involved in that case have such a
provision); id. at 536 (indicating that some Klamath Projects do not have the provision); id.
at 536 n.55 (reviewing other cases involving this type of provision in USBR contracts for
other projects).
47. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383.
48. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674–75 (1978).
49. See United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 694 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir.
1982).
50. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000). The ESA defines an endangered species as one that is “in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” id. § 1532(6), while
a threatened species is one that is “likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future.” Id. § 1532(20). Through rules issued under section 4(d) of the ESA, id.
§1533(d), the law typically applies equally to both types of species.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
53. NMFS is part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and is
sometimes called “NOAA Fisheries.”
54. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000), specifies the process and standards for listing
species as endangered or threatened. Listing decisions must be made “solely on the basis of
the best scientific and commercial data available” to the FWS or, for oceangoing species, the
NMFS. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000). In addition, this section requires designation of
“critical habitat” for any species at the time it is listed. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
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prohibits “taking” any member of a protected species of fish or
56
57
wildlife. This prohibition applies to “any person,” and the Act
defines “person” to include virtually any conceivable entity,
58
Under the Act, “‘take’ means to
including a federal agency.
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
59
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” FWS by
rule has defined “harm” in this context to include “significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
60
wildlife,” thus bringing some habitat destruction on private lands
61
within the Act’s prohibition of take.
62
Most important for purposes of this article is § 7, which gives
63
federal agencies additional duties to protect listed species. The
64
key provision is § 7(a)(2), which commands that every federal
agency “shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely modify
65
its designated critical habitat. Section 7(a)(2) couples this
substantive standard of “no jeopardy” with a mandatory process

55. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
56. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
57. Id. § 1538(a)(1).
58. Id. § 1532(13) (2000).
59. Id. § 1532(19) (2000).
60. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
61. The Supreme Court upheld this rule in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Under ESA § 10, the Services may issue an incidental
take permit to a non-federal entity, allowing legalized “take” of protected species where the
take would be “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000). The applicant for such an incidental take permit must
submit a conservation plan, better known as a habitat conservation plan or HCP, describing
(among other things) the applicant’s steps to mitigate or minimize take and the funding
available for these efforts. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
63. A federal agency action may incidentally result in take of a member of a listed species,
but if the agency has followed the requirements of § 7 with respect to that action, it may
receive an “incidental take statement” from the relevant Service that essentially authorizes a
certain level of take in connection with that action. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In addition, § 7(a)(1) directs all agencies affirmatively to use
their existing authorities to conserve listed species, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1), although courts
have rarely found an agency to have fallen short of this requirement. See J.B. Ruhl, Section
7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of
Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1126--1137 (1995), and cases cited
therein. But see Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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66

known as “consultation.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained the consultation triggers and process as follows:
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action
agencies”) to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife
agency . . . whenever their actions “may affect” an endangered or
threatened species. Thus, if the agency determines that a particular
action will have no effect on an endangered or threatened species,
the consultation requirements are not triggered. If the action agency
subsequently determines that its action is “likely to adversely affect” a
protected species, it must engage in formal consultation. Formal
consultation requires that the consulting agency . . . issue a biological
opinion determining whether the action is likely to jeopardize the
listed species and describing, if necessary, reasonable and prudent
alternatives that will avoid a likelihood of jeopardy. But if the action
agency determines that an action is “not likely to adversely affect” the
species, it may attempt informal consultation. This does not end the
consultation process. The consulting agency must issue a written
concurrence in the determination or may suggest modifications that
the action agency could take to avoid the likelihood of adverse effects
to the listed species. If no such concurrence is reached, the
67
regulations require that formal consultation be undertaken.

If the Service determines that the proposed action may
jeopardize the species, it must suggest “reasonable and prudent
alternatives” to avoid jeopardy while meeting the purposes of the
68
If the agency wants to proceed with the proposed
proposal.
action despite a biological opinion (“BO”) finding that the
proposed action might jeopardize the species, the agency may seek
an exemption from the cabinet-level Endangered Species
69
Committee. The agency must not proceed with the proposed
70
action until consultation is completed.

66. Id.
67. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(b)(3)(A) (2000).
69. Id. § 1532(e) (2000) specifies the membership, standards and procedures of the
Committee, which is better known as the “God Squad.”
70. “After initiation of consultation . . . the Federal agency and the permit or license
applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with
respect to the agency action which would have the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate
subsection 7(a)(2) of this section.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(d).
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Federal courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, have emphasized the
importance of federal agency compliance with the ESA’s
procedural requirements. Section 7 provides for “a systematic
determination of the effects of a federal project on endangered
species. If a project is allowed to proceed without substantial
compliance with those procedural requirements, there can be no
assurance that a violation of the ESA’s substantive provisions [i.e.
the jeopardy prohibition] will not result. The latter, of course, is
71
impermissible.”
C. USBR’s Duties under the Endangered Species Act
Several cases in recent years have defined USBR’s responsibilities
under ESA § 7. Through these cases, federal courts (primarily the
Ninth Circuit) have clarified that USBR must comply with § 7 when
its contracting activities or project operations may affect listed
72
species. In NRDC v. Houston, environmental plaintiffs challenged
the agency’s failure to consult before renewing water service
contracts with irrigators on the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) in
73
The Ninth Circuit held that USBR violated its
California.
§ 7(a)(2) duties by failing to request consultation with NMFS over
74
the effects of contract renewals on salmon protected by the ESA,
and upheld the district court’s decision to rescind the renewed
75
contracts pending the completion of consultation.
Courts also have held that § 7 requires USBR to consult on the
operations of existing projects where water deliveries may adversely
affect species protected by the ESA. Perhaps the most significant
case on this point is Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations
v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, where the district court held that
USBR violated its § 7 duties by not completing consultation on its
76
Klamath Project operations for the year 2000, and essentially
71. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184--93 (1978)).
72. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
73. USBR had renewed fourteen water service contracts with irrigation districts and other
water user organizations, each for a forty-year period, on terms similar to those of the
original contracts. See id. at 1123--24.
74. Id. at 1126--29 (“The Bureau had an affirmative duty to ensure that its actions did not
jeopardize endangered species, and the NMFS letter clearly disagreed with the agency’s
determination of no adverse impact.”).
75. Id. at 1129.
76. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The court took a particularly dim view
of USBR’s failure to consult on its 2000 operations, given that the agency had consulted in
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enjoined project water deliveries until consultation was completed
77
for 2001.
That consultation, in conjunction with an extreme
drought, resulted in a severe cutback in water deliveries to project
78
irrigators, leading to the 2001 “water crisis” in the Klamath Basin.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that USBR’s duties under § 7(a)(2)
take priority over its contractual commitments to project water
users. In a case involving USBR obligations under both the ESA
79
and the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, the court
rejected arguments by water users that USBR breached its contracts
80
by reducing water deliveries during certain dry years.
Additionally, in a case involving operational control of the Klamath
Project, the Ninth Circuit stated flatly that USBR’s responsibilities
81
under the ESA “override the water rights of the Irrigators.”
Within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, at least, USBR clearly
must operate its projects to avoid jeopardy even if that means
82
cutting water deliveries for irrigation and other contracted uses.
Some water users whose deliveries have been reduced because of
operating restrictions imposed on Reclamation projects under § 7
have sued the government for damages, claiming a temporary
“taking” of their water rights requiring compensation. In Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, irrigators argued that
ESA restrictions on CVP operations took their water rights by
reducing their deliveries from the California State Water Project,
83
which operates in coordination with the federal CVP. The Court
previous years and seemingly recognized the need to consult. Id. at 1244--45. The court
insinuated that the agency may have acted in bad faith by failing to move forward with the
consultation process in 2000. Id. at 1246.
77. Pending completion of consultation, the court required USBR to ensure specified
Klamath River flows before delivering any project water for irrigation. Id. at 1250.
78. For an account of the factors underlying the Klamath Basin dispute and the events
leading up to the 2001 crisis, see Benson, supra note 25, at 214–28.
79. The CVPIA requires USBR to dedicate 800,000 acre-feet of CVP water per year to fish
and wildlife restoration. See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d
1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2006).
80. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995).
81. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
1999). The case focused on whether USBR and the utility Pacificorp had acted properly in
modifying their contract for control of a Klamath Project Dam, where the modification had
the effect of benefiting listed species but increasing risks to irrigators.
82. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d
1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting flows provided for listed salmon in first eight years of
USBR ten-year operating plan for the Klamath Project as insufficient to meet ESA
obligations).
83. 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).
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of Federal Claims agreed, holding that the government was
required to compensate the irrigators for water they did not receive
84
in the years 1992–1994.
The successful Tulare plaintiffs had water delivery contracts with
85
the State of California, but irrigators who receive water from
federal projects under contracts with USBR have not yet fared so
well in asserting that ESA restrictions have taken their water
86
rights. In a case from the CVP, the Court of Federal Claims found
no taking after a full trial, based on its analysis of the statutes,
87
contracts, and facts specific to that case. The Court of Federal
Claims reached the same result on very different grounds in a case
from the Klamath Project, holding first that the irrigators could
pursue their claims only for breach of contract and not for taking
88
of property rights, and later rejecting the contract claims because
the enactment of the ESA was a sovereign act which could not give
89
rise to contractual liability for the government.
In certain cases, however, courts have been faced with the
threshold question of whether pre-ESA legal obligations require
USBR to operate its projects in a way that essentially leaves no room
90
to consider the needs of listed species. This issue has been hotly
contested in the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow litigation discussed
91
below, with no final resolution as of this writing. The existence or
absence of discretion is a key question because of an ESA
84. Id. at 319.
85. The facts in Tulare were somewhat unique, in that the plaintiffs were affected by ESA
restrictions on a federal water project but their contracts were with the State of California.
See Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 554–55 (2002). Thus, the irrigators in Tulare did not have
to overcome a common provision in USBR contracts which excuses the federal government
from liability for failure to deliver a full water supply. 49 Fed. Cl. at 321.
86. In a recent case from the Court of Federal Claims, Judge Wiese—who decided
Tulare—held that ESA restrictions on water deliveries from Reclamation projects must be
analyzed as regulatory (not physical) takings, essentially repudiating a crucial element of the
Tulare takings analysis. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007).
87. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 324 (2007). Earlier, the
Court had denied summary judgment, identifying a number of disputed factual issues. 70
Fed. Cl. 515 (2006).
88. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 504, 540 (2005).
89. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 685, 695 (2007).
90. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (USBR has
discretion in renewing CVP water service contracts); Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257
F. Supp. 2d 53 (USBR has no discretion to operate its projects on the Lower Colorado River
for the benefit of species existing solely in Mexico).
91. See infra Part IV.A.
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implementing rule that limits the applicability of § 7 to
discretionary agency actions. The following section of this article
examines this rule and Ninth Circuit cases applying it to various
federal activities.
II. THE “DISCRETIONARY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT OR CONTROL”
TRIGGER FOR ESA SECTION 7
A. The “Discretionary” Rule and its Context
92

ESA § 7(a)(2) requires each federal agency to “insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out” by the agency is not
likely to cause jeopardy to a listed species or adversely affect a
93
designated critical habitat. The statute does not define which (if
94
The
any) federal activities are not subject to this mandate.
definition of “action” in the ESA implementing regulations sheds
95
little additional light on the subject, but does offer a general list
96
of examples.
Since 1986, however, ESA implementing rules have contained an
important limitation, codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.03: “Section 7 and
the requirements of this Part apply to all actions in which there is
97
discretionary federal involvement or control.” Here, again, the
rules provide no definition or other language to explain
“discretionary federal involvement or control.” Nor does the
statute define the terms “discretion” or “discretionary”; to the
98
contrary, neither term even appears in § 7 or in § 3, which
92. This term means “any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States.”
16 U.S.C. § 1532(7) (2000).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
94. The ESA defines “Federal agency” broadly, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(7), but does not define
“insure,” “action,” “authorized,” “funded,” or “carried out.”
95. “‘Action’ means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried
out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or on the high seas.” 50
C.F.R. § 402.02.
96. According to this non-exclusive list, a federal agency would engage in “action” if it
promulgated rules, issued a permit or license, entered into a contract or lease, granted an
easement or right-of-way, or otherwise did something “directly or indirectly causing
modifications to the land, water, or air.” Id.
97. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 contains only this single sentence.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1532. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines “discretion”
to mean “Individual judgment; the power of free decision-making,” and “administrative
discretion” to mean “[a] public official’s or agency’s power to exercise judgment in the
discharge of its duties.”
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contains the ESA’s definitions.
Prior to 1986, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 did not contain the word
99
“discretionary.”
When the Departments of Interior and
Commerce jointly proposed to revise the rules governing
100
implementation of ESA § 7 in 1983, the agencies proposed that
§ 7 would apply to “all actions in which there is federal involvement
101
102
or control,” as provided by the then-existing rules. In finalizing
the rules, however, the agencies added “discretionary” to the text of
103
§ 402.03.
The final rulemaking notice is strangely silent on this
104
point.
Thus, even though § 402.03 has included the “discretionary
Federal involvement or control” language for over twenty years, the
meaning of this phrase has not been very clear—not only because
the 1986 rulemaking failed to define the word “discretionary” or
explain its insertion, but also because that term has no apparent
105
It is therefore not surprising that courts
basis in the ESA itself.
have struggled, with somewhat mixed results, to decide whether a
particular federal agency action is “discretionary” and therefore
subject to the requirements of § 7.
B. Ninth Circuit Cases Interpreting the “Discretionary” Rule
Since 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted
99. See 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986) (final rulemaking notice).
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (June 29, 1983).
101. Id. at 29,999.
102. See Derek Weller, Limiting the Scope of the Endangered Species Act: Discretionary Federal
Involvement or Control under Section 402.03, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 309, 323
(1999).
103. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,958 (June 3, 1986).
104. Id. at 19,937 (explaining § 402.03 generally but never addressing the addition of
“discretionary”). In his dissent in NAHB, Justice Stevens argued that because the agencies
had failed to explain the new word in their final rulemaking notice, they must not have
intended the change to have legal significance: “Clearly, if the Secretary of the Interior
meant to limit the pre-existing understanding of the scope of the coverage of § 7(a)(2) by
promulgating this regulation, that intent would have been mentioned somewhere in the text
of the regulations or in contemporaneous comment about them.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2542 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
105. By contrast, there is at least some statutory basis for the ESA implementing rules’
requirement that a “reasonable and prudent alternative” be one that can be “implemented
consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction.” 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02. Under § 7, if the Secretary issues a jeopardy opinion, he “shall suggest those
reasonable and prudent alternatives which . . . can be taken by the Federal agency or applicant in
implementing the agency action.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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§ 402.03 to exempt certain federal activities from § 7
106
requirements.
In Sierra Club v. Babbitt (Seneca), the Bureau of
Land Management (“BLM”) had authorized a logging company to
build a road across BLM lands, even though an agency biologist
had determined that the proposed logging road could adversely
107
affect the northern spotted owl. BLM believed it was required to
approve the road under a 1962 right-of-way agreement, under
which Seneca Sawmill could proceed with the road within thirty
days of giving notice to BLM unless the agency notified the
company that the proposed road did not satisfy one of three
108
specified criteria.
Environmental groups sued the Interior
Department for approving the road without consultation under § 7
and the agency argued that no consultation was needed because it
lacked the authority “to influence Seneca’s actions for the benefit
109
of the threatened spotted owl.” The government contended that
it had no authority to stop or alter the road for any reason except
the three specified in the 1962 agreement, even though BLM and
Seneca had entered into a 1991 stipulation whereby the company
agreed to conform its operations to all applicable state and federal
110
environmental standards.
A divided panel held that no
consultation was required, citing § 402.03 and deferring to the
Regional Interior Solicitor’s determination of the agency’s
111
authority. The majority concluded:

[T]he right-of-way agreement was granted prior to the enactment of
the ESA and there is no further action relevant to the spotted owl that
the BLM can take prior to Seneca’s exercise of their contractual
106. The Ninth Circuit is not the only court that has applied § 402.03 in determining an
agency’s duty to consult. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53
(D.D.C. 2003), discussed infra at note 268. This article focuses on the Ninth Circuit because
it is the venue for so much ESA litigation, giving it a better developed body of caselaw on this
issue than other courts.
107. 65 F.3d 1502, 1506–07 (9th Cir. 1995).
108. Under the agreement, BLM could notify the company that the proposed route for
the road was not the most direct, that the road would substantially interfere with existing or
planned facilities, or that it would result in excessive soil erosion. Id. at 1505.
109. Id. at 1508. More specifically, BLM argued that the 1962 right-of-way agreement was
the relevant action, and that approving the road under that agreement was not an agency
action within the meaning of § 7. Id. at 1507.
110. This stipulation gave BLM the right to halt construction or other operations if the
company were to violate any of the standards covered in the stipulation. Id. at 1506.
111. Id. at 1509.
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rights. . . . [W]here, as here, the federal agency lacks the discretion to
influence the private action, consultation would be a meaningless
exercise; the agency simply does not possess the ability to implement
112
measures that inure to the benefit of the species.

The court’s decision in EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co. was quite
similar to the Seneca case in many respects, although it dealt with a
federal agency’s duty to reinitiate consultation under an existing
113
If an agency has already consulted on an ongoing
permit.
activity, the agency must reinitiate consultation if the activity is
having unexpected impacts on listed species or if a new species is
114
However, the rules
listed that may be affected by the activity.
provide for reinitiating consultation if “discretionary Federal
involvement or control over the action has been retained or is
115
The EPIC plaintiffs argued that FWS was
authorized by law.”
required to re-consult on the Incidental Take Permit that it had
issued Simpson Timber years earlier, because new species had been
116
The key issue was
listed in the area covered by the permit.
whether FWS had discretionary involvement or control under the
existing permit. The majority felt that for this standard to be met,
“the permit must reserve to the FWS discretion to act to protect
117
One provision
species in addition to the northern spotted owl.”
seemed to confer exactly this kind of discretion: a commitment by
Simpson to submit logging plans that would not only address the
specific needs of the spotted owl, but also “modify silvicultural
systems as appropriate to ensure compatibility with the habitat
requirements of other species found within Simpson’s ownership
118
The
that are considered sensitive by state and federal agencies.”
majority somehow read this language as protecting only species
112. Id. (emphasis in original). Judge Pregerson dissented, arguing that the Court was
too quick to grant deference to the agency’s determination of its own authority, and that
BLM did retain adequate discretion over the road approval to trigger the requirements of
§ 7. Id. at 1513–14 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
113. EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.
115. Id.
116. EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1076 (noting that the permit addressed only the northern spotted
owl when it was issued in the early 1990s, and that since then the marbled murrelet and the
coho salmon had been listed in the area of Simpson’s lands). An incidental take permit
authorizes take by a non-federal entity under certain circumstances and subject to certain
conditions. See supra note 61.
117. EPIC, 255 F.3d at 1081 n.6.
118. See id. at 1080–81.
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(other than the owl) actually listed under the ESA at the time of
119
the permit.
Finding no permit provision that gave FWS the
120
requisite discretion, the court held that the agency had no duty
121
to reinitiate consultation.
A few Ninth Circuit cases under § 402.03 are best understood as
involving no federal agency action—that is, no program or activity
122
authorized, funded or carried out by a federal agency —rather
than an absence of agency discretion. The first such case was
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, in which plaintiffs challenged FWS’s
failure to consult on the issuance of certain letters pertaining to
123
timber companies’ proposed salvage logging on company lands.
This proposed logging was governed under California state statutes
and rules administered by the California Department of Forestry
124
The court held that CDF had
and Fire Protection (“CDF”).
regulatory authority over the companies’ logging plans, and that
125
Although the court
the federal agency role was solely advisory.
indicated at one point that FWS had no duty to consult because it
119. Id. at 1081. The court offered no support for reading “sensitive” to mean
“threatened or endangered,” despite the fact that the two designations have very different
meanings and different legal consequences.
120. In dissent, Judge D.W. Nelson argued that various provisions of the Simpson permit
and FWS’ permitting rules, provided more than adequate discretion to trigger § 7, and
criticized the majority’s “new requirement that the agency explicitly reserve the right to
implement measures to protect new species in the permit.” Id. at 1083--85 (D.W. Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
121. In another case applying § 402.03, the Ninth Circuit held that the Navy was not
required to consult on the potential effects of a program to retrofit submarines with a new
class of nuclear missiles at a base in Washington, because a Presidential order required the
Navy to carry out the program at that base. “[A]ny consultation by the Navy with NMFS
regarding the risks of accidental Trident II explosion on the threatened salmon species, if
such risks arise solely from the President’s siting decision, would be an exercise in futility.”
Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2004). The opinion deals primarily with environmental review requirements under the
National Environmental Policy Act, and provides a rather cursory analysis of the discretion
issue under the ESA.
122. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000), 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (definition of “action”).
123. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 1071--72.
125. The court concluded that
[FWS] merely provided advice on how the Lumber Companies could avoid a take under
section 9 of the ESA. Protection of endangered species would not be enhanced by a
rule which would require a federal agency to perform the burdensome procedural tasks
mandated by section 7 simply because it advised or consulted with a private party.
Id. at 1074.
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126

lacked discretion, it really meant that the agency exercised no
control over the activity and therefore took no “action” for
127
purposes of § 7.
Like the Marbled Murrelet case, two of the Ninth Circuit’s most
recent decisions regarding the applicability of § 7 are best
explained by a lack of agency action. In Western Watersheds Project v.
Matejko, the court held that BLM was not required to consult on
long-established rights-of-way for water diversions crossing its
128
And in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. Federal
lands.
Energy Regulatory Commission, the court upheld FERC’s refusal to
initiate consultation on an existing hydropower project license,
129
even though the project was apparently affecting listed salmon.
The license contained a provision allowing FERC to order
130
modifications for the protection of fish.
The agency, however,
chose not to initiate consultation, arguing that the license was set
to expire in four years and that early consultation had already
begun on the renewal. The court held that “the reopener
provisions do no more than give the agency discretion to decide
whether to exercise discretion,” and because FERC had taken no
action regarding the project since issuing a license in 1980, it was
131
Thus, California Sportfishing means that
not required to consult.
even where an agency clearly possesses discretionary power, it has
no duty to consult unless and until it actually authorizes, funds, or
126. The court stated, e.g,, “When an agency lacks the discretion to influence the private
action there is no agency action.” Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt (Seneca), 65 F.3d 1502,
1509 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
127. The court noted correctly that § 7 covers any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by a federal agency, but then incorrectly stated that “an action is an agency action if
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” Id. at 1073 (citing Seneca, 65 F.3d at
1509) (internal quotations omitted). The court thus mistook “discretionary involvement or
control” as the test for whether there is an agency action, rather than the test for whether an
agency action is subject to § 7. But the court clearly based its decision on the fact that the
FWS had no authority over private logging except for its ability to enforce the “take”
prohibition of ESA § 9, and that latent authority did not amount to an agency action. Id. at
1074.
128. 468 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven assuming the BLM could have had
some type of discretion here to regulate the diversions (beyond a substantial deviation [from
the use authorized in the existing right-of-way]), the existence of such discretion without
more is not an action triggering a consultation duty.”).
129. 472 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2006).
130. “The Licensee shall, for the conservation and development of fish and wildlife
resources, construct, maintain, and operate . . . such reasonable modifications of project
structures and operation, as may be ordered by [FERC] . . . .” Id.
131. Id. at 599.
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carries out some activity.
Arguments against the applicability of § 7 have not always
prevailed, however. In National Resources Defense Council v. Houston,
plaintiffs argued that USBR was required to consult before
renewing certain irrigation districts’ forty-year contracts for water
132
service from the CVP.
The districts argued that USBR had no
discretion to change the terms of the contracts in renewing them,
133
and in particular the quantity of water in the contracts.
Federal
attorneys opined that the USBR had no discretion to change the
quantity of water, but plenty of discretion to alter other contract
134
The court, however, found statutory discretion for USBR
terms.
to alter even the quantity of water in the renewed contracts: “The
federal reclamation laws, which provided the right to renewal, state
that the government is to renew the contracts on ‘mutually
agreeable’ terms [and] that water rights are based on the amount
135
It further suggested that a
of available project water . . . .”
project’s available water supply could legally be reduced in order to
136
meet ESA requirements.
The court concluded that even if the
original contracts guaranteed a fixed quantity of water on renewal,
USBR had discretion to alter other contract provisions, and “may
be able to reduce the amount of water available for sale if necessary
137
Thus, the agency was required by § 7 to
to comply with ESA.”
complete consultation before renewing the contracts.
Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries Service
involved NMFS’ issuance of permits for longline fishing vessels to
138
operate off the Pacific coast.
Plaintiffs alleged that these
operations harmed sea turtles protected by the ESA, and that the
agency was required to consult before permitting them. NMFS
139
argued that the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act gave the
agency no discretion to impose permit conditions for the benefit of

132. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
133. The districts raised this issue for the first time on appeal, id. at 1125 n.3, but
apparently the federal government did not participate in this appeal. Id. at 1124 n.2, 1125.
134. The government believed it could not change the quantity because of a federal
statute, 43 U.S.C. § 485h-1, giving the districts “a first right . . . to a stated share or quantity of
the project’s water supply.” Id. at 1126 (quoting Interior Solicitor’s opinion).
135. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted).
136. Id. (citing O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995)).
137. Id.
138. 340 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003).
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5501--09 (2000).
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141

sea turtles, and the district court agreed.
The appeals court,
however, held that the statute clearly gave NMFS broad authority to
142
impose conditions in permitting longline vessels,
including
143
The appeals court
conditions that would benefit sea turtles.
concluded that because the statute gave NMFS discretion “so that
the agency could condition permits to benefit listed species,”
144
consultation was required.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the agency’s “no discretion”
145
argument in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, involving EPA’s
duty to consult on the impacts of pesticides registered by the
agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
146
Plaintiffs introduced evidence that at least fiftyAct (“FIFRA”).
four registered pesticides were harming salmon protected by the
ESA, but EPA argued that FIFRA left it no discretion to consult on
the effects of products that it had already approved. The court
held that the agency had independent duties under the ESA
147
regardless of whether it was fully complying with FIFRA.
In
addition, the Ninth Circuit found discretion in FIFRA that would
allow EPA to consider the effects of an approved pesticide on listed
species: “Pesticide registrations under FIFRA are ongoing and have
long-lasting effects even after adoption. EPA retains discretion to
alter the registration of pesticides for reasons that include
environmental concerns. Therefore, EPA’s regulatory discretion is
not limited by FIFRA in any way” that would preclude application
148
of ESA § 7 to registered pesticides.
140. Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 972.
141. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Service, No. C-01-1706, 2001
WL 1602707 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 28, 2001).
142. The court emphasized language in the statute giving the agency authority to impose
conditions “necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations of the United States under
the Agreement, including but not limited to the markings of the boat and reporting
requirements.” Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 976 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 5503(d)) (emphasis added
by court). The “Agreement” is the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. See id. at 975-76 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 5501).
143. The court held that the statute was unambiguous on this point, and that the court
therefore would not defer to NMFS’ interpretation that it lacked discretion to condition
permits for turtle protection. Id. at 976.
144. Id. at 977 (emphasis in original).
145. Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005).
146. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000).
147. Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d 1024, 1030--32. This aspect of the court’s opinion is no
longer good law after the Supreme Court’s NAHB decision, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2007).
148. Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d 1024, 1033 (citations omitted). Thus, the court
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A few general points emerge from this line of cases on
discretionary action. First, the court has determined discretion by
parsing the language of the statutes, rules, and permits most
directly involved in disputes, with somewhat unpredictable results.
For example, the EPIC majority found no discretionary power to
protect species beyond the spotted owl despite a permit term that
149
seemed to provide that power clearly, whereas the Turtle Island
court found unambiguous authority to protect sea turtles from a
catchall provision of a statutory section dealing primarily with
150
Second, the
fishing boat markings and reporting requirements.
court has found no discretion in cases where a person has an
existing permit or approval, and a federal agency either has little or
no authority to require changes (e.g. Seneca), or has latent
discretionary authority but no legal duty to exercise it (e.g.
California Sportfishing). Third, all of the Ninth Circuit cases have
151
or agreement
involved an existing or new federal license
involving private activity, and none has involved a federal agency
claiming an absence of discretion in implementing its own land
management program or operating its own project.
Given the importance of the question of § 7’s applicability and
the number of Ninth Circuit decisions on this issue, it is not
surprising that one of these cases would eventually land in the
Supreme Court. Ironically, perhaps, the dispute that brought
§ 402.03 to the nation’s highest court involved another powerful
environmental statute: the Clean Water Act.
III. THE NAHB CASE: THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE
“DISCRETIONARY” TRIGGER
A. The Dispute and the Ninth Circuit Decision
In 2002, Arizona asked the EPA to delegate authority to the
Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”) to issue
permits under CWA § 402 for pollution discharges within the state.
In the recent past, EPA had consulted under ESA § 7 before
distinguished its earlier decisions in Seneca and Simpson Timber.
149. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
151. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (2000) (Administrative Procedure Act definition of “license” as
including “an agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership,
statutory exemption or other form of permission”).
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152

delegating § 402 permitting authority to states.
This time,
however, EPA took the position that it had no discretionary
authority to consider endangered species impacts in deciding on
Arizona’s application. Thus, despite concerns expressed by FWS
staff over potential impacts on listed species that might result from
delegating the permitting program to ADEQ, EPA maintained that
153
The issue was elevated to EPA
consultation was inappropriate.
and FWS headquarters, and eventually FWS agreed that although
listed species may lose protection when a state takes over § 402
permitting from EPA, this effect results from the requirements of
154
§ 402 itself, not from EPA’s delegation decision. In the end, FWS
issued a BO that essentially adopted EPA’s view of the effect of the
delegation language of § 402, and EPA then approved Arizona’s
155
request.
Environmental plaintiffs challenged EPA’s decision, arguing that
the agency had violated the ESA by delegating § 402 permitting to
156
ADEQ without adequately considering impacts to listed species.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, a divided Ninth Circuit panel held
that EPA did indeed have discretionary authority to consider
endangered species impacts in making delegation decisions under
157
In reaching this decision, the court stated that ESA § 7
§ 402.
itself provided an independent grant of authority to protect
species, “beyond that conferred by agencies’ own governing
158
The court also read the “discretionary involvement or
statutes.”
152. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 952 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct.
2518 (2007) (“Every pollution permitting transfer decision since 1993 has involved some
form of EPA consultation with FWS regarding endangered species.”).
153. Essentially, FWS expressed concerns that listed species might lose protection
because ADEQ might begin issuing permits without conditions to protect listed species,
contrary to EPA’s recent practice. The species involved included the southwestern willow
flycatcher, two plant species, and others. Id. at 952.
154. Id. at 953--54 (quoting from FWS BO on EPA’s decision regarding the Arizona
application).
155. Id. at 954--55, citing 67 Fed. Reg. 79,629 (Dec. 30, 2002) (delegating § 402 program
to Arizona).
156. Plaintiffs also argued under the Administrative Procedure Act that EPA’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious. In addition, they filed a separate suit challenging FWS’ BO on
the delegation, and the two cases were eventually consolidated. Id. at 955.
157. The court noted, as a threshold matter, that an agency must have some authority to
take measures to prevent harm to listed species; otherwise, the agency would be forced to
choose between violating the prohibitions of ESA § 7 and acting beyond their legal power.
Id. at 964.
158. Id. The court reached this conclusion based on its reading of TVA v. Hill (see supra
notes 1--8 and accompanying text), as well as its analysis of ESA text and legislative history.
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control” language of 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 as adding nothing to the
statutory language, by which § 7(a)(2) applies to actions
159
authorized, funded or carried out by a federal agency.
Based on
this reading of the rule, the question for the court was whether
EPA’s delegation decision was an agency action, not whether CWA
§ 402 itself left EPA any discretion to consider listed species in
160
The majority concluded that the
making that decision.
delegation decision was a federal agency action triggering § 7
requirements, and that the “EPA may have complied with its
obligations under the Clean Water Act, but compliance with a
complementary statute cannot relieve the EPA of its independent
161
obligations under section 7(a)(2).”
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the
government’s position regarding its discretionary authority. The
Court began by noting that CWA § 402 dictates that EPA “shall
approve” a transfer application that satisfies all nine statutory
requirements: “the statutory language is mandatory and the list
exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does
162
not have the discretion to deny a transfer application.”
The
Court then noted that the ESA also imposes a mandatory duty on
federal agencies, and it characterized the “no jeopardy” command
of § 7(a)(2) as adding an additional criterion to the existing list in
163
Framing the issue as an “implied repeal” of § 402 by the
§ 402.
later-enacted ESA, the Court noted that implied repeals are not
The court rejected the reasoning of cases from other courts which had reached the contrary
conclusion about the ESA as an independent source of authority to protect species, finding
that these cases “do not reflect a full consideration of the text and history of section 7(a)(2).”
Id. at 970.
159. Id. at 967.
160. In reaching this result, the court characterized its earlier cases involving § 402.03 as
interpreting that rule to be “coterminous” with ESA § 7(a)(2). Id. at 969.
161. Id. at 971. In dissent, Judge Thompson disagreed that EPA had discretionary
authority, and argued that earlier Ninth Circuit decisions supported that position. Id. at 979,
980 (Thompson, J., dissenting). The dissent took the position that in deciding on Arizona’s
application, EPA could consider only the nine factors specified in CWA § 402, and that
consultation would be an additional requirement inconsistent with the agency’s mandatory
duties under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 980.
162. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2007)
(citations omitted).
163. Id. at 2532 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 404 n.2 (9th Cir.
2006) (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)).
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favored, and it expressed concern that a literal reading of § 7(a)(2)
would “partially override every federal statute mandating agency
164
action . . . .”
The Court spun this potential conflict between the
ESA and other statutes into a “fundamental ambiguity” in the
165
166
language of § 7(a)(2), and applied Chevron deference to the
rule providing that § 7 applies to agency actions where there is
167
Having thus
“discretionary federal involvement or control.”
validated 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, the Court then interpreted the rule
168
more broadly than the Ninth Circuit had below: “§ 7(a)(2)’s nojeopardy duty covers only discretionary agency actions and does not
attach to actions (like the [§ 402] permitting transfer
authorization) that the agency is required by statute to undertake
169
once certain specified triggering events have occurred.”
In reaching this interpretation of § 7(a)(2), the Court had to
170
minimize the effect of its strongly worded opinion in TVA v. Hill.
The majority acknowledged that in the snail darter case, the Court
had “concluded that ‘the ordinary meaning’ of § 7 of the ESA
contained ‘no exemptions’ and reflected a ‘conscious decision by
Congress to give endangered species priority over the ‘primary

164. Id. at 2532--33.
165. As stated by the majority,
We must therefore read § 7(a)(2) of the ESA against the statutory backdrop of the many
mandatory agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal if it
were construed as broadly as the Ninth Circuit did below. When § 7(a)(2) is read this
way, we are left with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text.
An agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates set forth in § 7(a)(2) of
the ESA and § 402(b) of the CWA, and consequently the statutory language—read in
light of the canon against implied repeals—does not itself give clear guidance as to
which command must give way.
Id. at 2534.
166. Under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), unless
Congress has clearly expressed its intent on the specific issue before the agency, a reviewing
court will defer to an agency’s “reasonable” interpretation of a statute it is responsible for
implementing.
167. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2534. The Court deemed it reasonable to interpret § 7(a)(2) as
applying only to discretionary actions, because “when an agency is required to do something
by statute, it simply lacks the power to ‘insure’ that such action will not jeopardize
endangered species.” Id. at 2534--35 (emphasis in original).
168. Id. at 2535 (rejecting the Ninth’s Circuit’s interpretation of § 402.03, whereby the
rule was “congruent with the statutory reference to actions ‘authorized, funded, or carried
out’ by the agency,” and citing 420 F.3d 946, 968).
169. Id. at 2536 (emphasis in original).
170. See supra notes 1--8 and accompanying text.
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171

missions’ of federal agencies.’” The NAHB Court noted that TVA
v. Hill was decided years before § 402.03 was adopted, and insisted
that the agency action in the snail darter case was discretionary
because TVA was not required by statute to complete the Tellico
172
Dam.
Thus, the Court managed to distinguish TVA v. Hill, but
never really explained how it found “fundamental ambiguity” in
the same statutory provision that had once been so clear. Indeed,
the Court had stated in the earlier case, “One would be hard
pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer
173
than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.”
The majority completed its analysis by holding that EPA decisions
on delegating § 402 permitting programs are non-discretionary
actions for purposes of ESA § 7. Having already declared that the
CWA imposes a mandatory duty on the EPA to approve a state
request if the nine statutory criteria are met, the Court concluded
simply that “[n]othing in the text of § 402(b) authorizes the EPA to
consider the protection of threatened or endangered species as an
174
The Court
end in itself when evaluating a transfer application.”
also noted that EPA and the Services had already determined that
consultation was not required for these decisions, and since the
Services were interpreting their own regulation, that interpretation
175
was entitled to Auer deference.
Four justices dissented, arguing that the majority had not
attempted to read CWA § 402 and ESA § 7 in a way that would give
176
The dissent also argued that
effect to both statutory provisions.
under TVA v. Hill, § 7(a)(2) applies to any federal agency action,
discretionary or mandatory, and that 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 cannot be
read as imposing a new, “discretionary” limitation that is
177
inconsistent with the text of the ESA.
Finally, the dissent argued

171. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173, 185, 188 (1978)).
172. Id. at 2536--37.
173. TVA, 437 U.S. at 173.
174. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2537.
175. “An agency’s interpretation of the meaning of its own regulations is entitled to
deference ‘unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) . . ., and that deferential standard is plainly met here.” Id. at 2537--38.
176. Justice Stevens authored the dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. at 2538 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer authored his own brief dissenting opinion. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Much of the Stevens dissent was devoted to explaining two different approaches
whereby the Court could have given effect to both statutes. Id. at 2544--48.
177. Id. at 2541--43.
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that the EPA’s decisions regarding state delegation requests are
indeed discretionary, because the statute does give the agency some
discretion in deciding whether the nine criteria in § 402 are met.
The dissent pointed to no CWA language that would seem to
empower the EPA to consider the effects of a permitting transfer
on listed species, but argued that even the majority should be
willing to apply § 7 to this decision because § 402 did provide the
178
agency some discretion.
C. What NAHB Means for Agency Discretion and Section 7 Duties
The NAHB case seems likely to raise questions about federal
agencies’ duty to consult on a wide range of activities. Read
broadly, the majority opinion might significantly reduce the reach
of ESA § 7(a)(2). Thus, setting aside serious questions about
whether the Court’s 5-4 decision in the context of CWA § 402 was
179
correct, this subsection attempts to draw some lessons from that
decision that should be relevant to other, arguably nondiscretionary federal actions.
First, and most obviously, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 is good law. Despite
the clear tension between the statute, which makes § 7 applicable
to “any action authorized, funded, or carried out” by a federal
agency, and the rule, with its trigger of “discretionary Federal
178. “If we are to take the Court’s approach seriously, once any discretion has been
identified—as it has here—§ 7(a)(2) must apply.” Id. at 2549 (emphasis in original).
179. The Stevens and Breyer dissents—which combine to exceed Justice Alito’s majority
opinion in length—raise many of these questions, but the majority opinion is open to
dispute on additional grounds. For example, the Court’s rationale for declaring ESA
§ 7(a)(2) ambiguous is tenuous. Essentially, the majority first cast the issue as whether the
ESA had impliedly repealed CWA § 402(b), and then stated that a broad reading of
§ 7(a)(2) would “partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by
subjecting such action to the further condition that it pose no jeopardy to endangered
species.” Id. at 2533. The majority quoted earlier cases stating that “the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Id. at 2534 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132--33
(2000)) (internal quotations omitted). Unlike the usual case where statutory context is used
in interpretation, however, the “context” supposedly giving rise to ambiguity in § 7(a)(2) was
not other provisions of the same statute or related statutes, but unspecified provisions of
other, unspecified statutes that could be viewed as conflicting with ESA requirements. The
majority simply pointed in the general direction of the U.S. Code, and insisted that because
§ 7(a)(2) potentially could effect an en masse implied repeal of many provisions, “we are left
with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text.” Id. And with that,
the Court opened up § 7(a)(2) for agency and judicial interpretation, despite its famous
statement in TVA v. Hill that it would be hard to find a statute written any plainer than ESA
§ 7. See supra notes 1--8 and accompanying text.
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180

involvement or control,” the Court upheld the rule after finding
181
it eligible for Chevron deference.
The majority also rejected two
narrow (and somewhat strained) interpretations of the rule that
182
Thus, unless and
would have left it with little or no legal effect.
183
until it is changed by statute or rule, § 402.03 will continue to
limit the applicability of § 7 to those actions where a federal agency
exercises discretion.
Second, an agency has no discretion under § 402.03 if it is
“required by statute to take [an action] once certain specified
184
The emphasis on required must
triggering events have occurred.”
not obscure the other elements of a non-discretionary action as
185
specified by the Court: (1) the command must be in a statute, (2)
the statute must specify certain prerequisites, and (3) the statute must
direct the agency to take a particular action once those prerequisites
are met. Under this test, the EPA had no discretion regarding
Arizona’s request for § 402 permitting authority: the EPA was
required by the CWA itself (not by rule) to determine if the state’s
application met nine criteria specified in the statute, and to
delegate the authority if it did. Significantly, the majority found
that CWA § 402 set forth an exclusive list of criteria for the EPA to
consider in making these decisions, and that any additional
criterion—in this case, the “no jeopardy to listed species” standard
186
of ESA § 7(a)(2)—would conflict with the statutory mandate.
Third, although the Court stated that “discretion presumes that
180. See supra notes 163--69 and accompanying text.
181. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2533--35 (finding the statute ambiguous on the issue before the
Court, and upholding the agency’s interpretation as reasonable).
182. Id. at 2535--36 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s view of the rule as being coextensive
with the statute, as well as the dissent’s argument that § 402.03 does not limit the
applicability of § 7 only to discretionary actions).
183. Although the Court noted that § 7(a)(2) would pose a problem of implied repeals if
it were not limited to discretionary federal actions, id. at 2533, it did not indicate that
§ 402.03 was the only reasonable interpretation of the statute’s applicability, leaving open the
possibility that a future rulemaking could remove the “discretionary federal involvement or
control” language and still be eligible for Chevron deference. See Nat’l Cable Telecomm.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (prior judicial construction of a
statute trumps agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if prior
holding is based on unambiguous statutory text).
184. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (emphasis original). The court also emphasized required at
2534–35 (“[W]hen an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply lacks the power
to insure that such action will not jeopardize endangered species”).
185. The “implied repeal” issue arises only if an agency faces a conflict between a statute
and its duties under ESA § 7.
186. Id. at 2532--33.
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an agency can exercise ‘judgment’ in connection with a particular
action,” an agency may exercise judgment without having
187
discretionary involvement or control under § 402.03.
The
majority acknowledged that the EPA “may exercise some judgment
in determining whether a State has demonstrated” that its
application for permitting authority satisfies the statutory
188
By restricting the EPA to deciding whether the
requirements.
nine criteria are met, however, the CWA does not allow the sort of
judgment that would subject the agency decision to ESA § 7:
“Nothing in the text of § 402(b) authorizes the EPA to consider the
protection of threatened or endangered species as an end in itself
189
when evaluating a transfer application.” Thus, the question is not
whether an agency exercises judgment in deciding on a particular
action, but whether the statute leaves room for the agency to
consider the needs of listed species in making that decision.
Fourth, an administrative decision that a particular agency action
involves no discretionary federal involvement or control is entitled
to deference from the courts, but only if the decision is made by
FWS or NMFS, not the agency taking the action. In NAHB, the
Court noted that both Services had recently determined that EPA’s
decisions on delegating § 402 permitting authority are nondiscretionary under § 402.03. The Court accepted the Services’
(rather than the EPA’s) interpretation under Auer, whereby courts
defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules “unless plainly
190
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” If an agency were
to claim that one of its activities was non-discretionary under
§ 402.03, that claim would not receive Auer deference because the
191
agency would be interpreting the Services’ rule, not its own.
Fifth, although it refused to follow TVA v. Hill in its
187. Id. at 2535 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16
(1971)).
188. Id. at 2537.
189. Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority failed to follow its own logic
when it acknowledged that EPA does exercise some judgment in these decisions, but found
that the agency did not have the kind of discretion that would trigger § 7. Id. at 2548--49
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2537--38 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
191. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (denying Auer deference to agency that
interpreted a regulation that merely restated statutory language because an agency gains
“special authority to interpret its own words” when it uses its own expertise and experience
to develop a rule). See also NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2543--44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
EPA would not be entitled to Chevron deference for interpreting the ESA, because the
Interior and Commerce Departments administer that statute).
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interpretation of ESA § 7(a)(2), the NAHB Court did not undercut
a key conclusion of that earlier case: that the ESA “reveals a
conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority
192
The majority
over the ‘primary missions’ of federal agencies.”
distinguished TVA v. Hill because in the earlier case, the federal
agency was not required by statute to build the Tellico Dam
193
Despite repeated
regardless of its effects on listed species.
statements by Congressional appropriators directing TVA to build
194
Tellico Dam in spite of the ESA and the snail darter, the NAHB
Court deemed that project “discretionary” because these
195
statements were in report language, rather than in statute. Thus,
even where Congress has clearly expressed an intent for an agency
to do something, it appears that the action is non-discretionary
under § 402.03 only if the agency is required to act by statute.
Perhaps surprisingly, NAHB is generally consistent with the Ninth
196
Circuit’s approach in cases other than Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA.
In those cases, the Ninth Circuit generally read § 402.03 as
triggering ESA § 7 only for those actions involving agency
discretion, and it found that discretion only where the laws
governing that action gave the agency some freedom to consider

192. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978).
193. In regard to TVA’s duty to build Tellico Dam, the NAHB Court characterized its
earlier decision thusly:
Central to the Court’s decision was the conclusion that Congress did not mandate that
the TVA put the dam into operation; there was no statutory command to that effect; and
there was therefore no basis for contending that applying the ESA’s no-jeopardy
requirement would implicitly repeal another affirmative congressional directive.
NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536--37 (emphasis in original).
194. See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 163--71 (describing statements, primarily by the
Appropriations Committees, expressing the belief that the ESA did not apply to the Tellico
Project and directing TVA to complete it).
195. The majority even argued that the dissent was wrong in believing that TVA would
have had to finish the dam if the snail darter had not been listed under the ESA: “[T]he Acts
appropriating funds to the TVA . . . simply did not require the agency to use any of the
generally appropriated funds to complete the Tellico Dam Project.” NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at
2537 n.9 (citing TVA, 437 U.S. at 189--93) (emphasis in original). Perhaps only the Supreme
Court would view a federal agency as free to disregard clear, specific, repeated directives in
Appropriations Committee and conference report language relating to appropriations
statutes for the sole reason that the directives do not appear in the text of the statutes
themselves.
196. Defenders of Wildilife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. National
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
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197

listed species in making its decisions. The Ninth Circuit departed
from its own precedent in Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA by reading the
rule as coextensive with the “any action” language of ESA §
198
7(a)(2), and by holding that EPA had an independent duty to
comply with § 7 even if the CWA left the agency no room to
consider listed species in deciding on Arizona’s application for
199
Thus, even though the NAHB opinion
permitting authority.
mentions none of the other Ninth Circuit cases, its decision may be
viewed as returning the law approximately to where that circuit had
brought it before Defenders. If anything, by emphasizing that an
agency is not subject to § 7(a)(2) if another mandatory statute
leaves it no discretion to consider the needs of listed species, the
Court may have made it more difficult for an agency to claim that
rules, contracts or other legal constraints leave it with no discretion
under § 402.03.
Nonetheless, NAHB undoubtedly will embolden those both
inside and outside the federal government who would like to
reduce the sweep of ESA § 7. The effects of that case probably will
be disputed in many contexts, but one is nearly certain: the
operation of federal water projects by the USBR. The next section
analyzes the extent to which these operations are, or should be,
subject to § 7(a)(2) in light of the NAHB decision.
IV. USBR’S SECTION 7 DUTIES RELATING TO PROJECT OPERATIONS
AFTER NAHB
Long before the Supreme Court’s NAHB decision, USBR’s
discretion was a hot issue in litigation over endangered species and
use of Reclamation project water. This section examines how that
issue has been addressed in the ongoing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
litigation, and then provides legal and policy considerations
relevant to USBR’s § 7 duties in operating federal water projects.

197. See supra notes 160--161 and accompanying text.
198. Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 969. Although the court characterized this
conclusion as being consistent with its earlier cases, the cases themselves contradict that
statement, as they generally interpret § 402.03 less narrowly.
199. Id. at 967, 971. On this latter point, the Ninth Circuit had reached the same
conclusion in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005).
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A. Disputing USBR’s Discretion: the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
Litigation
The legal dispute over the fate of the Rio Grande silvery
200
minnow and water use in New Mexico’s “middle” Rio Grande is
201
complex, and several authors have addressed it in detail.
The
focus of the dispute is a small fish, once abundant throughout
much of the Rio Grande watershed but now nearly extinct in the
wild because dams, diversion structures, and low flows have altered
its river habitat dramatically. By the time the minnow was listed in
1994, FWS believed that the species was located only in a 170-mile
reach of the Rio Grande between Cochiti Dam and the headwaters
202
of Elephant Butte Reservoir. Flows in this stretch of the river are
heavily influenced by the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
(“MRGCD”), which diverts water for irrigation of more than 60,000
203
acres within a 150-mile-long area south of Santa Fe. MRGCD has
contracts to receive water from two USBR projects, the Middle Rio
Grande Project and the San Juan-Chama Project; several other New
Mexico water users, notably the City of Albuquerque, also have San
204
Although the silvery minnow litigation
Juan-Chama contracts.
205
has involved a wide range of issues, the case has come down to a
206
under these
dispute over whether USBR has any discretion
200. Hybognathus amarus.
201. See, e.g., Joan E. Drake, Student Writing, Contractual Discretion and the Endangered
Species Act: Can the Bureau of Reclamation Reallocate Federal Project Water for Endangered Species in
the Middle Rio Grande?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487 (2001); Sean O’Connor, Comment, The Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow and the Endangered Species Act, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673 (2002); Beth
Richards, Case Note, The Pump Don’t Work Because the Bureau Took the Handle: The United States
Bureau of Reclamation’s Discretion to Reduce Water Deliveries to Comply with the Endangered Species
Act, 4 WYO. L. REV. 113 (2004); Ethan R. Hasenstein, Note, Frankenstein and Pitbull?
Transmogrifying the Endangered Species Act and “Fixing” the San Juan-Chama Project after Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 34 ENVTL. L. 1247 (2004).
202. Final Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed.
Reg. 36,988 (July 20, 1994). In listing the species as endangered, FWS also identified other
factors for the silvery minnow’s decline, including competition from non-native species. Id.
at 36989.
th
203. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1134 (10 Cir. 2003), vacated
as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
204. See id. at 1122--27 (discussing these two projects and their associated contracts).
205. See id. at 1115--20 (summarizing history through early 2003).
206. At one time, the Corps of Engineers’ discretion in operating three dams on the Rio
Grande—Abiquiu, Cochiti, and Jemez Canyon—was also in dispute. In contrast to the USBR
dams, which are operated almost exclusively for water supply, the Corps dams are primarily
flood control facilities. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 996--97
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contracts and the relevant statutes, such that the two projects must
be operated subject to the requirements of ESA § 7.
In the late 1990s, with the silvery minnow continuing to slide
toward extinction despite its ESA listing, USBR initiated § 7
207
consultation on its project operations.
In its 1999 biological
assessment, however, USBR argued that its operating discretion was
limited by its “obligation to meet water orders from users in
accordance with contract obligations. In meeting these obligations,
[USBR] exercises discretion in how water is stored in system
reservoirs and released through federal facilities, but that
discretion is narrowed by the contract requirements and delivery
208
USBR also argued that its operating discretion was
schedules.”
constrained by both project authorizing statutes—“Congress
authorized the Middle Rio Grande Project for domestic, municipal,
and irrigation purposes only,” not for fish habitat—and general
Reclamation laws: “[W]ater can only be stored and released from
Reclamation reservoirs for valid beneficial uses, and consequently
must be released at a time and in a way to meet water delivery
209
calls.”
Thus, even though USBR consulted on its project
operations, that consultation was narrowly circumscribed by the
agency’s view of its discretion. USBR contended, and FWS
210
agreed, that USBR could not reduce deliveries to users holding
contracts for San Juan-Chama Project or Middle Rio Grande
211
Project water, regardless of the ESA.
(D.N.M. 2002). In the first reported Silvery Minnow decision, the district court found that
statutes provide “rather clear operating criteria” for operating these dams and specify narrow
grounds for deviating from these criteria. Id. at 996--98. It held that the Corps is therefore
not subject to the requirements of ESA § 7. Id. at 998--99. The court distinguished the
USBR projects, which operate under “more discretionary language” than do the Corps
facilities. Id. at 997--98. The plaintiffs did not challenge this holding on appeal. Silvery
Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1115 n.2.
207. See Drake, supra note 201, at 496--97.
208. Drake, supra note 201, at 497–98 (quoting BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR & ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PROGRAMMATIC
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS RELATED TO WATER
MANAGEMENT ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW MEXICO 14 (Oct. 1999)).
209. Id.
210. See 469 F. Supp. 2d at 998--99 (noting that FWS adopted USBR’s legal position
regarding USBR’s limited discretion in operating the projects).
211. Not surprisingly, the users themselves also argued that USBR had no discretion to
reduce their water deliveries. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant City of
th
Albuquerque at 22–23, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973 (10 Cir.
Nov. 18, 2002) ( Nos. 02-2254, 02-255, 02-2267, and 02-2304) (arguing that Albuquerque’s
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The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico (Judge
Parker) disagreed, holding that USBR does have sufficient
discretion to reduce water deliveries as needed to meet its ESA
obligations, and that its consultations on project operations must
212
therefore not exclude that possibility.
The court found
discretion to reduce Middle Rio Grande Project deliveries primarily
in a provision of the 1963 contract between USBR and MRGCD,
stating that “in no event shall any liability accrue” against the
United States in the event of a shortage of project water caused by
213
“drought and other causes.” The court thought it appropriate to
read this provision broadly “because drought and dryness are what
214
affect the continued existence of the silvery minnow.” As for the
San-Juan Chama Project, the court held that USBR could consider
reallocating water to endangered species based on three provisions
215
of the relevant contracts, and because Congress had authorized
this project to supply water for a variety of uses and to provide fish
216
and wildlife benefits in the Rio Grande Valley.
Unlike the issue
of discretion to reduce Middle Rio Grande Project deliveries, which
it had called a close question, the court concluded that USBR
clearly had discretion to shift San Juan-Chama Project water to
217
endangered species.
Even though it had lost the battle regarding discretion, the
contract and the project authorizing statute do not allow water to be used for endangered
species).
212. Silvery Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 998--99.
213. Id. at 991--92. The 1963 agreement amended the original 1951 contract between
USBR and MRGCD, which provided that the U.S. would not be liable “[s]hould there ever
occur a shortage in the quantity of water which normally would be available through and by
means of said project . . . .” Id. at 991.
214. Id. at 994. The court concluded that when these contract terms are viewed “together
with BOR’s statutory duty to limit MRGCD’s diversions to amounts reasonably needed for
beneficial use, BOR’s discretion becomes even more manifest.” Id. The court’s discussion of
the beneficial use issue appears at 992.
215. The court described these three provisions as:
(1) a provision that “during periods of scarcity when the actual available water supply
may be less than the estimated firm yield,” the contracts “shall share in the available
water supply” pro rata with other contractors; (2) a clause immunizing BOR from liability
for failure to deliver water to the contractors because of “shortages” resulting from
“drought and any other causes;” and (3) a provision reducing contractors’ costs to
reflect a higher portion of water going to fish and wildlife needs.
Id. at 995 (citations to administrative record omitted).
216. Id. (citing Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. 87-483 (76 Stat. 96)).
217. Silvery Minnow, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 994–96.
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government had won the war over project operations—
temporarily—because Judge Parker’s decision of April 2002 had
nonetheless upheld the 2001 BO, which did not provide for
218
reducing project water deliveries to contractors. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit dismissed all appeals on the discretion issue in September
219
2002.
In that same month, however, FWS—prompted by USBR
and extreme drought conditions in the Rio Grande basin—issued a
new BO that allowed the key reach of the river to go dry,
220
potentially wiping out the last wild population of silvery minnows.
When the plaintiffs challenged the new BO, Judge Parker chastised
USBR for continuing to insist that it lacked discretion to cut project
water deliveries to benefit the minnow, and for doing nothing to
avert a looming extinction crisis. The court invalidated the new
BO, re-stated its earlier holding regarding USBR discretion to
reduce water deliveries, and ordered the agency to provide certain
221
It concluded its order with an
minimum flows through 2003.
unmistakable command: “If necessary to meet flow requirements
in 2003, . . . [USBR] must reduce contract deliveries under the San
Juan-Chama Project and/or the Middle Rio Grande Project . . .
consistent with [USBR’s] legal authority as determined in the
222
Court’s April 12, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order.”
218. Id. at 999 (“Even though FWS accepted BOR’s erroneous view that it lacked
discretion . . . to alter water deliveries to contractors, FWS came up with an interim solution
to avoid jeopardy in coordination with all the major players in the middle Rio Grande
basin.”). The court observed that the federal agencies had made “a valiant effort to protect
the minnow without altering water deliveries to federal contractors,” and had arrived at an
interim solution that “may be workable.” Id. at 1000. The court noted, however, that in the
future, “when the parties go back to the table, either in informal negotiations or in
reinitiation of formal consultation, the annual water deliveries that I have identified as
discretionary will be available to be considered for use in protecting the endangered silvery
minnow from extinction.” Id.
219. The court dismissed appeals from the contractors for lack of standing, because they
could not show that their water deliveries would actually be reduced as a result of the lower
court’s rulings on discretion. The government’s appeals were dismissed because the case was
ongoing in the lower court, and the appeal offered no basis for interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction. Rio Grand Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 46 Fed. Appx. 929, 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2002).
220. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225--28, 1231--32
(D.N.M. 2002) (noting that USBR had proposed to allow the “all-important” San Acacia
reach—home to nearly all of the remaining wild minnows—to dry up, and that “extensive
river drying in the San Acacia Reach could result in the extinction of the silvery minnow in
the wild”).
221. The court allowed lower flows for the remainder of 2002 than would have been
allowed under the 2001 BO. For 2003, the court required USBR to maintain the flows
provided in 2001 BO unless and until a new one was issued. Id. at 1237--38.
222. Id. at 1238.
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A divided Tenth Circuit panel affirmed Judge Parker’s
223
decision.
The majority focused on contract provisions allocating
a portion of project costs to fish and wildlife, precluding
government liability for water shortages due to drought or other
causes, and providing that contracts will share in the shortfall when
the “actual available water supply” is less than expected, and
concluded:
These clauses, taken together, establish that BOR retained the
discretion to determine the “available water” from which allocations
would be made, allotments, which, in times of scarcity, might be
altered for “other causes,” the prevention of jeopardy to an
endangered species. The terms of these negotiated contracts,
properly read together, presume BOR’s discretion in their
implementation. Moreover, reading BOR’s discretion to manage and
deliver “available water” out of the plain language of the Repayment
224
Contracts disconnects them from their congressional authorization.

The court also endorsed the district court’s reliance on three
225
226
Ninth Circuit cases, O’Neill v. United States, NRDC v. Houston,
227
and Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, in which the
court had held that USBR has authority to allocate project water
for endangered species. The government sought to distinguish
228
because they involved a statute unlike any that
these cases
229
pertains to the Rio Grande projects, but some of the key contract
terms were similar, and the Tenth Circuit identified “general
precepts” of the cases which supported its interpretation of the Rio

223. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot,
355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
224. Id. at 1129. The court also noted that no contract provision specifies an absolute
quantity of water. Id. at 1130–31.
225. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
226. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
227. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999).
228. According to the court, USBR sought to distinguish those cases “on the ground that
subsequently enacted legislation, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, expressly
allocated project water for fish and wildlife,” leaving those cases irrelevant to the Rio Grande
projects, for which no such legislation existed. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1128. The CVPIA
was no factor in Klamath Water Users.
229. Authorizing statutes for the Middle Rio Grande and San Juan-Chama Projects
appeared to play a minor role in the majority’s decision regarding USBR discretion,
although the court did note various provisions of the project authorizations relating to fish
and wildlife. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1122, 1125.
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230

Grande project contracts.
The two majority judges also produced a “concurring” opinion
231
on the unmistakable terms doctrine of federal contract law. This
opinion stated that any contract to which the government is a party
“remains subject to the demands of a subsequent exercise of
sovereign power unless the contract expressly provides in
unmistakable terms that subsequent sovereign acts will not affect it.
A silent contract preserves the government’s right to modify it by
232
subsequent legislation.” The concurrence stated that because the
USBR contracts have no provisions explicitly immunizing them
from future legislation, the unmistakable terms doctrine applies,
233
allowing the ESA to modify the contracts.
Judge Kelly dissented sharply, finding no discretion in any of the
234
contract provisions relied upon by the majority.
He also found
no discretionary authority in any applicable federal statute, and
distinguished the trio of Ninth Circuit cases relied upon by the
235
majority. Finally, Judge Kelly argued that the unmistakable terms
doctrine did not operate to allow the ESA to alter these contracts,
because § 7 does not even apply in the absence of discretionary
230. According to the court, the three Ninth Circuit cases provide these three applicable
principles:
First, under principles of contract interpretation, the plain terms govern. Second, the
contracts, written under the reclamation laws, and all “acts amendatory and
supplementary thereto,” envision applying subsequent legislation in their interpretation.
Finally, the plain terms of the shortage clauses provide the basis for BOR’s retaining
discretion to allocate available water to comply with the ESA.
Id. at 1130.
231. Judge Porfilio wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judge Seymour, who
wrote the concurring opinion in which Judge Porfilio joined. Id. at 1138 (Seymour, J.,
concurring). Neither opinion explains this curious arrangement. One can only surmise that
the judges were reluctant to base their majority opinion on a doctrine—the “unmistakable
terms” doctrine of federal contract law—that had been “largely ignored in this litigation,”
and not even mentioned in the government’s briefing. See id. at 1139 n.1.
232. Id. at 1139, citing United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 877--78 (1996)
(opinion of Souter, J.).
233. Id. at 1139.
234. Id. at 1145--46 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Judge Kelly devoted much of his dissent to
examining specific contract provisions and finding that none provides discretion to reduce
water deliveries under the ESA. Most significantly, he concluded that the contract terms
shielding the government from liability for water shortages “are defensive in nature, and to
interpret them as affirmative grants of discretion to enforce the ESA and reduce contract
deliveries in the absence of a shortage does violence to their language and intent.” Id. at
1151.
235. Id. at 1153--57.
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236

federal power, which the dissent found absent here.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision prompted a petition for en banc
rehearing, but within months the panel’s decision had been
237
Nonetheless, the case precipitated a flurry of
vacated as moot.
legal activity, including issuance of a new BO for project
operations, Congressional enactments immunizing the San-Juan
Chama Project from the ESA and the new BO from legal challenge,
238
and settlement of all issues involving the City of Albuquerque. A
dispute persists, however, over USBR’s discretion to operate the
239
In
Middle Rio Grande Project to meet ESA requirements.
November 2005, Judge Parker refused to vacate his earlier
decisions on USBR discretion regarding that project, and instead
entered a final judgment incorporating those decisions as they
240
relate to the Middle Rio Grande Project.
As of this writing, the
matter is once again up on appeal before the Tenth Circuit; more
than five years after Judge Parker first ruled that USBR has
discretion to reduce deliveries to water users on the Rio Grande,
241
the matter remains unresolved.
Although the Middle Rio Grande has been ground zero for the
legal dispute over USBR project operational discretion, the basic
question in the Silvery Minnow litigation would be the same at many
242
Briefly stated, the question for any project is whether
projects.
236. Id. at 1148--49.
237. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 355 F.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).
The court found the appeal moot for various reasons, including a subsequent Congressional
enactment relating to the San Juan-Chama Project, the effective expiration of Judge Parker’s
injunction, and favorable climatic conditions that had resulted in better habitat for the
minnow. Id. at 1219--21.
238. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007, 1011 (D.N.M. 2005),
explains these various developments.
239. Id. at 1009 (scope of USBR’s discretionary authority to operate the Middle Rio
Grande Project to benefit the minnow “remains a live and justiciable issue”).
240. Id. at 1015--16. The court explained that his decision would allow the parties
“another opportunity to appeal the important discretion issue as it relates to the MRGP.” Id.
at 1011.
241. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Nos. 05-2399, 06-2020, and 06-2021 (10th Cir.
filed Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006).
242. Shortly before the Tenth Circuit’s Silvery Minnow decision, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia decided another case involving USBR project operations, this time
on the Lower Colorado River. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C.
2003). In that case, plaintiffs argued that the Interior Department had a duty to consult
more broadly on its operation of federal water projects on the Lower Colorado, a stretch of
river where the allocation of water is dictated by a unique set of federal statutes, U.S.
Supreme Court decrees, interstate agreements, and international treaties known as the “Law
of the River.” See id. at 57--58. Interior argued that it had no duty to consult over the impact
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under the reclamation statutes, water rights, and contracts
governing the project, USBR has discretion to operate the project
to benefit listed species, if that operation could harm traditional
243
project beneficiaries. The Tenth Circuit’s vacated opinion in the
Silvery Minnow case indicates how complex that question can be,
and the NAHB decision has added another wrinkle to the analysis.
With the caveat that each project has its own legal regime, the
remainder of this section offers some general observations on this
question that will be relevant to most if not all USBR projects.
B. Legal Considerations Regarding USBR Project Operations and
Discretion
1. Operating a Water Project is an Inherently Discretionary
Activity
Cases applying 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 to a particular federal agency
action typically focus intensively on the law applicable to that
action, inquiring whether that governing law gives the agency the
244
kind of discretion that would trigger ESA § 7.
In the context of
USBR project operations, however, it seems appropriate to begin
by considering the nature of the activity itself.
Operating a federal water project is highly complex, partly
of its operations on listed species living exclusively in Mexico for two reasons: the Law of the
River (especially a Supreme Court decree) prohibited the agency from increasing water
deliveries to Mexico, and the agency had no control over the species’ habitat in Mexico
because water was managed by Mexico once it crossed the border. The court agreed that the
agency was not required to consult over its impacts on Mexican species for these reasons,
concluding that “it seems unlikely that any case will present facts that more clearly make any
agency’s actions nondiscretionary than this one: a Supreme Court injunction, an
international treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between the government and water users
that account for every acre foot of lower Colorado River water.” Id. at 69.
243. Although Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, id., held that Interior lacked discretion to
consult on the impacts of its operations on certain listed species, that decision may not
translate to other federal water projects because of the unique nature of the Law of the River
(especially regarding deliveries to Mexico), plus the fact that the species involved were
beyond the territory and control of the United States. Both legally and factually, the Silvery
Minnow case is far more representative of most USBR projects that may affect a listed species
than Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton.
244. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2537
(2007) (CWA § 402(b) leaves EPA no discretion to consider listed species in deciding
whether to transfer permitting authority to a state); see also Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 975--77 (9th Cir. 2003) (High Seas
Fishing Compliance Act gives agency discretion to protect sea turtles in issuing permits for
fishing vessels.).
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because USBR must manage the project to meet an array of legal
obligations, such as irrigation, flood control, recreation, power
245
generation, and meeting tribal water needs. Even if the law were
relatively simple, however, USBR would face major practical
challenges in determining how much water to store and release on
any given day in light of uncertainty about available water supplies,
demands for water and power, and other variables. Consider the
following description of USBR’s difficulties in managing Upper
Klamath Lake, part of the Klamath Project:
The Bureau of Reclamation must manage water resources carefully in
order to meet its competing purposes and obligations. This need to
strike a proper balance is particularly challenging because Upper
Klamath Lake is relatively shallow and therefore, the Klamath
Project’s storage capacity is limited. Water levels in the Lake vary
from year to year, depending to a significant extent upon the
previous winter’s snowfall and temperature, and on precipitation
conditions during the spring and summer.
In order to prepare Project operation plans, the Bureau of
Reclamation relies on the Natural Resources Conservation Service
(“NRCS”) Streamflow Forecast for key areas in the Upper Klamath
Basin. The NRCS forecast period runs from April 1 to the end of the
current water year, September 30. NRCS issues its forecasts on a
monthly basis, between January and June. The reliability of these
forecasts increase [sic] with each month, as the forecast period
becomes shorter. Weather changes during the year, however, (for
example, due to unusually hot and dry conditions, or unusually rainy
conditions) may significantly affect Upper Klamath Lake inflows as
246
well.

Thus, for each of its projects USBR must constantly assess its
duties, the available facts, and predictions about the future, make
its best decisions in light of these factors, and make changes as
circumstances dictate. In short, if a discretionary action is one that
245. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138
F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (describing USBR’s legal duties in managing the
Klamath Project, including water supply contracts for irrigation, delivering water to national
wildlife refuges, honoring reserved water rights of tribes, protecting tribal trust resources
including salmon, and complying with ESA § 7). While not every project is operated for all
of these purposes, each is very important to the overall Reclamation program. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
246. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 138 F. Supp.2d at 1231 (internal citations
omitted).
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247

involves an exercise of judgment, then operating a large, multi248
purpose federal water project is about as discretionary as it gets.
For this reason, USBR project operations are very different from
the kinds of agency action that courts have held to be nondiscretionary under § 402.03, such as transfer of permitting
authority from EPA to a state (NAHB) or approval of a logging road
across public lands under an existing agreement (Seneca). Those
cases involved a one-time decision by a federal agency in response
to a specific request from a non-federal entity, and the only
question for the agency was whether that request met an
established set of defined criteria. One might say that those nondiscretionary actions involved little more than an agency reviewing
an application against a prepared checklist and deciding whether
to stamp the application “approved” or “disapproved.” Operating a
water project, by contrast, is an ongoing, dynamic, multi-factor,
forward-looking exercise—an activity that not only allows for
agency discretion, but demands it.
2. No General Statute Strips USBR of Operating Discretion.
In the Silvery Minnow litigation, both the District Court and
Tenth Circuit opinions analyzed the discretion issue by combing
through the statutes and contracts relevant to two specific
Reclamation projects in New Mexico, searching for language that
would provide USBR the discretion to reduce water deliveries to
existing users in order to preserve the minnow’s last remaining
249
Judge Parker and the Tenth Circuit
habitat in the Rio Grande.
250
majority found that discretion, primarily in contract provisions;
251
Judge Kelly, the Tenth Circuit dissenter, emphatically did not. In
light of the recent NAHB decision, however, it is not clear that any
247. See NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2535 (agency discretion presumes an exercise of judgment
regarding a particular action).
248. As stated by the Ninth Circuit in a recent case involving operation of the vast, multifaceted Central Valley Project, “[T]he Bureau’s is an extremely difficult task: to operate the
country’s largest federal water management project in a manner so as to meet the Bureau’s
many obligations. Recognizing this difficulty, Congress granted the Bureau considerable
discretion in determining how to meet those obligations.” Cent. Delta Water Agency v.
Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 1021, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006).
249. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text.
250. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 994, 996 (D.N.M. 2002);
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated as moot, 355
F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
251. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d 1109, 1145 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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of the judges in Silvery Minnow have been asking the right question.
The majority opinion in NAHB rests on the conclusion that a
federal statute, the Clean Water Act, prohibits the EPA from
considering the needs of endangered species in deciding whether
252
to delegate permitting authority to a state.
The Court
interpreted § 402.03 to mean that ESA § 7 does not apply to actions
that a statute requires an agency to take. This interpretation, it
reasoned, “gives effect to the ESA’s provision, but also comports
with the canon against implied repeals because it stays § 7(a)(2)’s
mandate where it would effectively override otherwise mandatory
253
Thus, according to the words and logic of
statutory duties.”
NAHB, an agency is free from § 7(a)(2) duties where a federal
statute imposes a duty that leaves no room for ESA compliance.
No generally applicable statute strips USBR of discretion in
operating its projects. To the contrary, the agency has had
authority since the original 1902 Reclamation Act “to perform any
and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be
254
The 1902 Act
necessary and proper” to implement the statute.
also authorized and directed the Interior Secretary “to use the
reclamation fund for the operation and maintenance of all
reservoirs and irrigation works constructed under the provisions of
255
Far from ordering USBR to manage project water in
this act.”
one specific way, these longstanding provisions seem to provide
USBR with wide discretion to do what is “necessary and proper” in
operating projects.
Some might argue that § 8 of the 1902 Act imposes a mandatory
duty on USBR to operate its projects in accordance with state water
laws, thus depriving the agency of discretion to consider listed
256
species in project operations (except where state law allows).
Even under California v. United States, however, USBR must follow
state-law requirements only if they are “not inconsistent with

252. NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2532--33. The Court framed the issue as one of implied repeal,
id. at 2532--33, and that rationale would apply only if an agency’s duties under ESA § 7 were
to conflict with a duty imposed by another federal statute.
253. Id. at 2534.
254. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 10, 32 Stat. 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 373 (2007)).
255. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 6, 32 Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 491 (2007)).
256. In his Silvery Minnow dissent, Judge Kelly insisted that allowing USBR “to consult and
presumably reallocate water . . . is in considerable tension” with Section 8 and with Supreme
Court authority “recognizing that the federal government generally must respect state-law
water rights . . . .” 333 F.3d 1109, 1157--58 (10th Cir. 2003) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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congressional directives.”
Reclamation statutes beyond § 8 also
restrict USBR’s flexibility to a limited extent; for example, § 9(c) of
258
the 1939 Reclamation Project Act allows the agency to enter into
contracts to supply water to cities or to furnish electric power from
its projects, but only if, “in the judgment of the Secretary, it will not
259
impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.” That
provision shows an intent to preserve irrigation over other uses, but
it only applies to new contracts for non-irrigation purposes, and
even there it still places the decision “in the judgment of the
Secretary.”
One also might argue that the cases applying § 402.03 did not ask
whether the federal agency had any discretion in taking a particular
action, but rather, whether it had discretion to weigh the needs of
listed species in making the decision. While that is true, those cases
all involved a legal framework that required an agency to make a
decision based on certain defined criteria that seriously
constrained the agency’s discretion; the question in those cases was
whether that limited discretion left the agency any room to protect
260
The question in those cases was not
the species in question.
whether the relevant law had affirmatively granted the agency
discretion to protect listed species, but rather, whether the law had
foreclosed that discretion by specifying the factors the agency could
consider in making a particular decision. In operating its projects,
USBR simply does not operate within tight statutory limits that
would raise a serious question about what it can do with the little
discretion it has remaining.
Congress has not imposed mandatory, statutory duties that apply
generally to the operation of all Reclamation projects, but may
establish such duties for one particular project, thus eliminating

257. 438 U.S. 645, 678 (1978). Moreover, California v. United States directly or indirectly
identified a number a congressional directives that would effectively preempt state law. See
Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests v. State Authority under Federal
Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 280 (2006).
258. Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 485h(c) (2007)).
259. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (2007).
260. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. at 2537
(CWA § 402 has exclusive list of nine criteria, leaving no room for EPA to consider the
protection of listed species); EPIC v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080–81 (9th Cir.
2001) (permit gave agency discretionary power to impose protections for the spotted owl,
but not species listed after the permit was issued).
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operational discretion for purposes of § 402.03 and ESA § 7.
Congress enacted such a statute in response to the Tenth Circuit’s
262
decision in the Silvery Minnow case when it prohibited USBR from
using its discretion, “if any, to restrict, reduce or reallocate any
water stored in Heron Reservoir or delivered pursuant to San JuanChama Project contracts . . . to meet the requirements of the
263
Endangered Species Act . . . .” That sort of specific, unambiguous
language would certainly be effective in freeing USBR from its
duties under § 7(a)(2). But because few projects have anything
like this San Juan-Chama statute, there is only a weak argument
that all the others must be operated according to a nondiscretionary statutory mandate under the NAHB test.
3. Water Supply Contracts do not Divest USBR of Operating
Discretion.
In the absence of a statute that would deprive USBR of the
264
discretion needed to trigger its duties under ESA § 7,
the
government’s position has been that its contracts with certain water
users leave it no discretion to reduce deliveries to those users,
regardless of the ESA. As summarized by the Tenth Circuit in
Silvery Minnow, “BOR contends that the Repayment Contracts
define their obligations under the ESA. Because the contracts do
not expressly permit a reduction in deliveries of project water
below their fixed amounts, BOR maintains it lacks discretion to
265
In other words,
comply with the ESA” under 50 C.F.R. § 402.03.

261. Of course, Congress has imposed other mandatory, statutory duties on the
Reclamation program from the very outset. For example, § 5 of the 1902 Act limited the
number of acres on which any landowner could receive project water, and also required that
the landowner “be an actual bona fide resident on such land.” Reclamation Act of June 17,
1902 § 5, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 389, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431(2007).
262. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (describing and
citing to the relevant provisions of appropriations acts for fiscal year 2004 (imposing oneyear restriction on use of San Juan-Chama Project water) and fiscal year 2005 (making the
restriction permanent)).
263. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137 §
208, 117 Stat. 1827 (Dec. 1, 2003).
264. The 2003 appropriations rider regarding the San Juan-Chama Project, id., was
enacted after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109
(10th Cir. 2003), and before that decision was vacated as moot, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
2004). However, no such statute applies to the Middle Rio Grande Project, where USBR’s
discretion to operate for the benefit of the minnow remains a live issue. Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (D.N.M. 2005).
265. 333 F.3d at 1127 (footnote omitted).
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the government maintains that the contracts represent a binding
commitment by USBR that forces the agency to operate its projects
in a way that ensures full water supplies to the contract users,
leaving no authority to reduce those supplies to avoid jeopardy to
listed species.
There are several fundamental problems with this argument.
Most obviously, these contracts are not statutes, and so they do not
present the “implied repeal” problem that was fundamental to the
266
Further, no statute elevates these
Court’s analysis in NAHB.
contracts to the status of a nondiscretionary mandate that USBR
must meet regardless of any other legal responsibility. The NAHB
majority opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an agency need not
comply with ESA § 7(a)(2) if its requirements seemingly conflict
267
with another mandatory federal statute. Although NAHB does not
state that only statutorily required actions can be non-discretionary
under § 402.03, neither does it give any indication that anything
else would qualify, and no other argument for avoiding the
268
statutory mandates of ESA § 7 would fit the NAHB rationale.
The contracts themselves do not lock USBR into operating its
projects solely for the benefit of the contract water users. The
agency apparently takes the position that it has no discretion even
to take actions that would increase the risk that these users will not
269
receive a full water supply from its projects.
Many contracts
266. See supra notes 176–185 and accompanying text.
267. 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (ESA “alters § 402(b)’s statutory command,” and would also
“result in the implicit repeal of many additional otherwise categorical statutory commands”);
id. at 2534 (Section 402.03 resolves the problem by excusing compliance with § 7 “when the
agency is forbidden from considering such extrastatutory factors,” and is reasonable because
it does not interpret § 7 “to override express statutory mandates”); id. at 2535 (“an agency
cannot be considered the legal cause of an action that it has no statutory discretion not to
take”) (emphasis in the original); id. at 2536 (“§ 7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy mandate covers only
discretionary agency actions and does not attach to actions . . . that an agency is required by
statute to undertake . . . .”) (emphasis in the original).
268. See id. at 2536 (§ 402.03 is reasonable interpretation of statute “because it gives effect
to the ESA’s provision, but also comports with the canon against implied repeals because it
stays § 7(a)(2)’s mandate where it would effectively override otherwise mandatory statutory
duties”).
269. USBR evidently took this position in 2002, when it refused to release water from
Heron Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season for the benefit of the silvery minnow,
even though users had already received all their contracted water for that year. The agency
refused to release the water because it was concerned that 2003 and future years would also
be dry, and chose to hold all available water in the reservoir so as not to risk cutting future
deliveries to contract users. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 123134 (D.N.M. 2002). The court wrote, “The BOR gives the benefit of the doubt to a dire
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provide for delivery of a specific quantity of water, but nearly all
USBR contracts also have terms that shield the government from
liability for failing to deliver a full water supply on account of
271
The government argues that these
drought or other causes.
hold-harmless clauses apply “only to circumstances in which it is
‘impossible’ to deliver the fixed contractual water, not to situations
in which it creates the shortage for purposes of complying with the
272
ESA.”
That argument conflicts not only with the broad “other
causes” language contained in many of these contract provisions,
but also with cases interpreting such provisions in the context of
273
Judge
requirements imposed by the ESA and other statutes.
Kelly, dissenting in Silvery Minnow, argued that these clauses are
“exculpatory” and “defensive in nature, and do not represent an
274
affirmative grant of discretion to enforce the ESA.” Nonetheless,
they represent a recognition that the contracts do not guarantee a
fixed quantity of water, and that drought is only one circumstance
that may prevent the project from delivering a full supply. Judge
Kelly is probably right in arguing that these provisions do not
provide an affirmative grant of discretion to USBR, but he is almost
certainly wrong in suggesting that without such an affirmative grant
of discretion, the contracts alone would free USBR of any duties to
comply with ESA § 7(a)(2).

drought prediction, not to the silvery minnow. BOR and the FWS propose to put the silvery
minnow in certain jeopardy now based on the assumption of continued drought conditions
in the future.” Id. at 1233. The court also noted that in deciding whether to hold water in
the reservoir or release it for the minnow in 2002, “the potential harm to [project]
contractors in releasing water from Heron Reservoir was emphasized while the harm to the
silvery minnow was downplayed.” Id. at 1234.
270. For example, Albuquerque’s contract for San Juan-Chama Project water specifies
101,800 acre-feet. See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1123–24.
271. See id. at 1124, 1126. The language of these clauses varies somewhat from contract to
contract, but commentators and courts have noted that clauses of this type appear in USBR
contracts “with high consistency.” See id. at 1146 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Benson,
supra note 37, at 393–94).
272. See id. at 1127 (emphasis in original). For example, the failure of the newly
completed Teton Dam made it impossible for USBR to perform its water delivery contracts.
See Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 763 F.2d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 1985)
(denying recovery for water losses caused by Teton Dam failure, based in part on contract
language absolving the U.S. of liability for losses caused by failure of storage facilities).
273. See, e.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 682--83 (finding a clause excusing
government liability for failure to deliver water “on account of errors in operation, drought,
or any other causes” covered shortages caused by requirements of the ESA and Central
Valley Project Improvement Act).
274. See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1151 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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This last point is reinforced by a basic principle of federal
contract law, the sovereign acts doctrine. The Supreme Court has
stated this principle as follows:
While the Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter
contracts that confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to
honor those rights, we have declined in the context of commercial
contracts to find that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise
one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to
exercise that power in the contract. Rather, we have emphasized that
without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when
unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts
subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless
surrendered in unmistakable terms.
Therefore, contractual
arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is party,
275
remain subject to subsequent legislation by the sovereign.

The Ninth Circuit applied this principle to a USBR contract as
276
early as 1990, and used it to uphold the application of the federal
277
environmental laws to such contracts in 1993.
In the Tenth
Circuit’s vacated Silvery Minnow opinion, both majority judges
produced a concurring opinion stating that because the contracts
did not waive the government’s sovereign authority in
unmistakable terms, the ESA “modifies the contracts because the
contracts do not affirmatively state that future legislation will not
278
Most recently, the Court of Federal Claims—in a
apply.”
remarkably thorough and scholarly opinion on this subject—relied
on the sovereign acts doctrine to hold that USBR did not breach its
contracts with Klamath Project water users when it withheld water
279
for endangered species in 2001, resulting in shortages for project
275. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)
(quotations omitted).
276. See Peterson v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 811--12 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding “hammer clause” of 1982 Reclamation Reform Act regarding delivery of project
water to lands in excess of legal acreage limit).
277. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding potential modification of contract terms resulting from application of ESA or
National Environmental Policy Act).
278. Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1139 (Seymour, J., concurring). This concurring opinion
stated that it was applying the unmistakable terms doctrine, but the principle is the same one
stated in Bowen. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
279. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007). Having found that
enactment of the ESA was a sovereign act within the terms of the doctrine, the court
concluded that:
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280

irrigators.
281
The 1996 case of United States v. Winstar Corp., in which the
Supreme Court produced four opinions but none gained a
majority of votes, has created significant uncertainty about the
future application of the sovereign acts doctrine to federal
282
In both the Silvery Minnow concurrence and the
contracts.
Klamath case, however, the courts sorted through the Winstar mess
and concluded that the doctrine does cover the application of the

[I]f the sovereign acts doctrine is applicable, the government is not liable for contract
violations caused by a sovereign act, unless the unmistakability doctrine is triggered. . . .
Here, as plaintiffs readily admit, there are no unmistakable terms in any of the contracts
precluding the government from exercising its sovereign powers-indeed, the water
shortage clauses in most of the contracts reflect the opposite intent. Instead, plaintiffs
assert that any silence of the contracts on this point should be read in their favor, as
precluding the United States from enforcing the ESA. That claim, however, is decidedly
contrary to the law regarding the unmistakability doctrine and, indeed, would turn that
doctrine on its head.
Id. at 695 (citations omitted).
280. Another recent case from the Court of Federal Claims, however, states that the
sovereign acts doctrine would not have protected the government from liability for failing to
deliver a full water supply from the New Melones Dam because it would not have been
impossible for the government to do so and still meet its duties under the environmental laws.
Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 372--73 (2007). That conclusion
is dictum, however, because the court determined for other reasons that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that USBR breached the contracts. Id. at 376. On plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration, the court rejected the government’s arguments that it had misapplied the
sovereign acts doctrine, and explained why it had required the government to show that
performance was impossible. Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 497
(2007). There is an active disagreement among the courts about whether the government
must show impossibility of performance in order to gain the benefit of the sovereign acts
doctrine. See Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 508–12 (impossibility
is required); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 691–95 (impossibility is
not required). However, even if the government needs to show that it cannot possibly
comply with both its ESA duties and its contracts, it may be able to meet this burden in some
circumstances. For example, the government argued that it couldn’t possibly give water to
the irrigators and the silvery minnow at the end of the 2002 irrigation season. See Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225--26 (D.N.M. 2002).
281. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). In Winstar, the Court found the
government liable for breaching contracts with certain financial institutions. A later-enacted
federal statute had effectively nullified a key element of those contracts, and the Court
determined that the sovereign acts doctrine did not shield the government from liability in
that case.
282. For an excellent analysis of Winstar and a discussion of its potential effect on future
contract disputes—including those involving USBR contracts—see Michael W. Graf, The
Determination of Property Rights in Public Contracts after Winstar v. United States: Where Has the
Supreme Court Left Us? 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 197 (1998).
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283

Endangered Species Act to USBR contracts. The Winstar plurality
opinion seemed to narrow the sovereign acts doctrine by stating
that it applies only in circumstances where sovereign power would
284
be blocked —but sovereign power would indeed be blocked if the
contracts left USBR with no power to protect species under ESA §
7(a)(2), and so that crucial aspect of Winstar is no help to the
285
Given that the
government or the contract users in this context.
ESA is clearly a “sovereign act” that was not intended to change
contract terms for the government’s benefit, and that very few if
any USBR contracts could be construed as unmistakably
surrendering the government’s sovereign powers, it would certainly
appear that this basic principle of federal contract law does apply in
286
this context.
Here again, the sovereign acts doctrine does not affirmatively
grant discretion for purposes of § 402.03, but it does not need to.
The question is whether water supply contracts eliminate USBR’s
discretion so as to preclude it from meeting its mandatory duties
under ESA § 7. Under the sovereign acts doctrine, the contracts
could do so only if they surrendered the government’s powers in
unmistakable terms.
USBR simply did not abandon all
discretionary power when it entered into contracts to supply
project water. To the contrary, under basic principles of federal
law, Congress essentially assured that the government could
continue to exercise ongoing sovereign power when it provided for
287
Reclamation project water to be delivered under contract.
283. In Silvery Minnow, the two concurring judges analyzed both the Winstar plurality and
dissenting opinions and concluded that either approach would leave the doctrine applicable
to the dispute over contracts and the ESA on the Rio Grande. 333 F.3d at 1140--41
(Seymour, J., concurring). In Klamath Irrigation District, 75 Fed. Cl. at 682--95, the court
considered and rejected a variety of plaintiffs’ arguments based on Winstar.
284. 518 U.S. at 879. The plurality found that the government could not rely on the
doctrine in that case, because the Winstar plaintiffs sought only damages, and their requested
relief did not amount to an exemption from the new law. Id. at 881--82.
285. See Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1140 (Seymour, J., concurring).
286. See Klamath Irrigation District, 75 Fed. Cl. at 683–85, 695 (plaintiffs admit that Klamath
Project contracts have no such terms). The government has argued that the sovereign acts
doctrine does not apply to USBR contracts because the ESA has not directly required that
project water be dedicated to species habitat. Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellants at 54–
55, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, Nos. 05-2399, 06-2020, and 06-2021 (10th Cir. filed
Dec. 2005–Jan. 2006). The government has cited no authority to indicate that the doctrine
applies only where the statute itself, as opposed to action by the regulatory agencies
entrusted by Congress with administering the statute, creates a conflict with contractual
obligations.
287. Contracts have been a part of the Reclamation program from its early days, and a
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Under § 402.03 as interpreted by the courts, USBR’s obligation
to consult in operating its projects comes down to the existence or
absence of agency discretion. This discretion question will be
answered primarily by standard legal analysis, through the
interpretion of statutes, contracts, and cases. But as with any ESA
controversy, serious policy issues are bubbling just below the
surface of the legal dispute. The remainder of this section
identifies policy concerns that relate to USBR’s project operation
duties under § 7.
C. Policy Concerns Relating to Exempting Project Operations from
Section 7
Underlying the legal dispute about agency discretion is a policy
difference over the proper application of § 7 to federal projects
that have supplied water for irrigation and other purposes since
before the ESA was enacted. Conservationists tend to regard § 7 as
an essential tool for ensuring the continued existence of aquatic
and riparian species whose habitats have been dramatically altered
by USBR projects (among other factors). Water users, on the other
hand, believe that the water from these projects belongs to them
because they have used it for years and have met their obligations
under their government contracts. These two camps may agree
generally on the desirability of preserving both irrigation and
endangered species, but not on whether it is appropriate for the
ESA to shift project water from farmers to fish. Aside from that
simple question of values, however, the question of § 7(a)(2)’s
application to project operations raises some more nuanced issues.
Excluding project water deliveries from the § 7 consultation and
no-jeopardy requirements would represent a change from
established practice on many projects, where USBR has been
consulting for several years on the effects of its operations on listed
288
In other words, “no discretion for USBR” means less
species.
requirement of the program since 1926, when Congress prohibited delivery of water from
any new project “until a contract or contracts in form approved by the Secretary shall have
been made with an irrigation district or irrigation districts,” providing for payments in
annual installments over a period not exceeding 40 years. Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, 44
Stat. 649 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 423e). By then, however, many contracts were already in
existence, and the statute authorized the Secretary to amend existing contracts. 44 Stat. 648,
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 423d.
288. This is true at least for projects located within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
For example, FWS issued its first BO on the effects of Klamath Project operations on Lost
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protection for listed species affected by Reclamation water
deliveries, especially as to those projects where ESA consultations
have already occurred. This rollback could mean extinction in the
wild for the Rio Grande silvery minnow and serious trouble for
other species whose survival depends on adequate water from a
USBR project. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any other
(existing) federal law would fill the resulting void in regulatory
protection for these species, given the basic premise that project
water deliveries are so firmly anchored in legal concrete that even
289
ESA § 7(a)(2) cannot budge them.
It is true that USBR project operations and associated water uses
would remain subject to ESA § 9 and its prohibition on “take” of a
290
Both in practice and in policy, however, § 9
listed animal.
enforcement makes a poor substitute for § 7 consultation in its
application to Reclamation projects. In practice, § 9 cases have
always been rare; despite the relatively clear causal links between
291
water withdrawals, dry streams, and dead fish, there is still no
reported decision finding a “take” resulting from diversions that
292
A dramatic increase in § 9 enforcement
dewatered a river.
River and shortnose suckers in 1992. See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson,
204 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1999). NMFS produced its first BO on CVP operations on
winter Chinook salmon in 1993. See Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water Dist., 849 F.
Supp. 717, 724 n.13 (E.D. Cal. 1993). In revising the “Operating Criteria and Procedures”
governing operation of the Newlands Project (Nevada), USBR consulted with FWS on effects
of the revisions on the cui-ui fish as early as 1988. See 62 Fed. Reg. 66,441, 66,463 (Dec. 18,
1997).
289. In California, a state statute—Section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code—may protect
fish populations below USBR dams. In litigation over the operation of Friant Dam, a part of
the CVP, the courts held that USBR was subject to § 5937 because that statute was a state law
requiring USBR compliance under § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 919–21 (reviewing law of the case
regarding application of § 5937 to USBR); id. at 924–25 (holding that USBR has violated §
5937 in operating Friant Dam).
290. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
291. One should not underestimate, however, the conceptual and practical challenges of
proving “take” of listed fish in the context of water management and use. See James R.
Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law about Imposing ESA
Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595,
609–23 (analyzing several such problems).
292. For a discussion of the shortcomings of § 9 enforcement in protecting listed species,
see Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the Similarities
between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 61 (2004).
This article notes an unreported federal court decision from Idaho finding take by a water
user. The Ninth Circuit later reversed and remanded, holding that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment in light of a factual dispute about the harm caused
by defendant’s diversions. Idaho Watersheds Project v. Jones, No. 03-35870, slip op. at 3 (9th
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actions seems unlikely, although if § 7 no longer applies to USBR
project water deliveries, it is reasonable to expect environmental or
fishing groups to bring a few more cases. But even if such cases
restore some measure of protection for listed species, § 9 is inferior
to § 7 in the context of USBR project operations. Compared to the
consultation process, “take” enforcement will mean more decisions
made in the federal courts rather than the expert agencies, greater
focus on establishing past harm to individual listed animals rather
than developing “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to conserve
293
the species in the future, and increased scrutiny of the actions of
294
private water users rather than the government’s operations.
Collaborative processes are another potential source of
protection for listed species, and USBR has argued in favor of this
approach for addressing ESA issues associated with project water
295
Existing cooperative efforts regarding listed species and
use.
USBR projects, however, got their start primarily because key
players—including water users and western state governments—
were concerned that § 7 consultations on project operations might
296
For example, the
result in reduced deliveries for existing uses.
Cir. Apr. 18, 2005).
293. The ESA implementing rules define “reasonable and prudent alternatives” to mean
“alternative actions identified during formal consultation that can be implemented in a
manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action, that can be implemented
consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction, that is [sic]
economically and technologically feasible,” and that the Service believes would avoid
jeopardy to the species or adverse modification of critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
294. Environmental plaintiffs have sometimes (successfully) sued government agencies
rather than private resource users, arguing that the government violated § 9 by authorizing
private activities that resulted in take. For example, the First Circuit held that the State of
Massachusetts violated § 9 by issuing permits for fixed fishing gear to be placed in that state’s
coastal waters, where that gear was harming endangered whales. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d
155, 162--66 (1st Cir. 1997). But if USBR were to establish that it had no discretion to reduce
project water deliveries for purposes of § 7, it would have an excellent argument that its
operations are not the legal cause of harm to the species under § 9. Thus, the focus would
shift to the water users themselves, whose diversions could be viewed as the proximate cause
of any alleged harm to the protected species. See generally Rasband, supra note 323, at 623--29
(arguing against “vicarious liability” for government agencies under ESA § 9, especially in the
context of water use in the West).
295. In its 2003 Water 2025 policy statement, USBR stated that success in meeting ESA
requirements “almost always requires a collaborative effort between stakeholders,” and went
on to say that “the twin goals of recovery of endangered species and meeting the water needs
of people cannot be attained when the issues and resources are locked into a cycle of shortterm litigation and decision-making.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 20 (August
2005), available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water%202025-08-05.pdf.
296. See Benson, supra note 324, at 74–75 (discussing importance of the ESA in
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State of Wyoming has complained about the cooperative federalstate program for addressing ESA issues on the central Platte River,
but has remained involved because it wants to avoid the Platte
297
If it becomes clear that the Platte
becoming “another Klamath.”
will not become the next Klamath because § 7 does not apply to the
operation of USBR projects on the North Platte River, the State of
298
Wyoming, at least, may well pick up its marbles and go home. To
the extent that ESA § 7 no longer creates uncertainty about future
water deliveries from USBR projects, cooperative efforts are likely
either to disband or to continue their existence primarily for public
relations purposes. It is ironic that USBR has urged cooperation as
the only sensible path for addressing ESA concerns associated with
project water uses, while simultaneously pursuing a legal strategy
that would remove the primary motivation for such efforts to make
meaningful strides toward conserving listed species.
In contrast to cooperative efforts, the push to remove USBR
project operations from § 7 coverage offers no “win-win” solutions.
To the extent that the courts uphold the government’s position
and agree that there is no discretion to reduce water deliveries
despite the ESA, the users simply gain certainty and the species
simply lose protection. At best it’s a zero-sum game, and if it leads
to a decline in cooperative efforts and a rise in § 9 enforcement
cases, the game will only get more contentious, focusing more on
motivating cooperative efforts to address water use impacts on listed species, including the
“CalFed” initiative, the Carson-Truckee water settlement, and the Upper Colorado
Endangered Fish Recovery Program).
297. Mike Besson, at that time the Director of the Wyoming Water Development
Commission, said in 2004 that he did not like the cooperative program for endangered
species recovery in the Platte River Basin, but that Wyoming would remain in the process.
“What I’m trying to prevent is another Klamath.” Andrew Beck Grace, Truce Holds on the
Platte River, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 16, 2004, at 3.
298. Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal announced in 2006 that he was signing the
agreement reluctantly because “there are no good choices in this area.” Without a
cooperative agreement, he wrote, Wyoming would be faced with a “federal regulatory
framework in which . . . the states, municipalities, industries, and irrigators would be left
subject to the whims of the federal government in the context of individual consultations—
on both new and existing uses—on any project or activity in the Platte River Basin which has
a federal nexus.” In signing the agreement, however, Freudenthal wrote that he took “solace
from [Nebraska] Governor Heineman’s recent correspondence and his reminder that, if at
any time the Program progresses in a direction counter to the best interests of Wyoming, I
can push away from the table and take a different course.” Press Release, Governor Dave
Freudenthal, Governor Signs On to Platte River Agreement (Nov. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.waterchat.com/News/State/06/Q4/state_061201-03.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2007).
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establishing liability and less on developing solutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
299

In the Tulare Lake case discussed above, the Court of Federal
Claims found that ESA restrictions had taken plaintiffs’ water
rights, and concluded with the following sentence: “The federal
government is certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay
300
for the water it takes to do so.”
One could disagree sharply with
301
the court’s legal analysis—and many have —yet still perceive some
basic equity in that final soundbite.
The dispute over USBR’s discretion in operating its projects,
however, is not a matter of compensation for water users. The
question is whether the government remains “free to preserve the
fish” and other imperiled species. If the answer is no, that would
represent a loss of existing protection for species affected by USBR
projects, an unwarranted extension of the Court’s recent decision
in NAHB, and a rollback of a statute whereby Congress once made
saving species from extinction the highest of national priorities.

299. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
300. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001).
301. As noted by the Court of Federal Claims in another case involving a claim by
irrigators that ESA restrictions had taken their water rights, “Tulare has been the subject of
intense criticism by commentators who, inter alia, have challenged the court’s application of
a physical taking theory to what was a temporary reduction in water.” Klamath Irrigation
Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 n.59 (citing three articles); see also Melinda Harm
Benson, supra note 87, at 583–87.

